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ARTICLES
THE  FIXATION  THESIS:  THE  ROLE  OF
HISTORICAL  FACT  IN  ORIGINAL  MEANING
Lawrence B. Solum*
INTRODUCTION
The meaning of the constitutional text is fixed when each provision is
framed and ratified: this claim can be called the Fixation Thesis.  This thesis is
one of two core ideas of originalist constitutional theory: the other is the
Constraint Principle, which holds that the original meaning of the constitu-
tional text should constrain constitutional practice.
From one perspective, the Fixation Thesis is obvious.  Imagine that you
are reading a text written quite some time ago—a letter written in the thir-
teenth century, for example.  If you want to know what the letter means (or
more precisely, what it communicates), you will need to know what the words
and phrases used in the letter meant at the time the letter was written.  Some
words may be archaic—no longer used in contemporary English.  Other
words may have changed their meaning over time—and you would want to
know what their meaning was in the thirteenth century.  And meaning is not
just a function of the meaning of individual words and phrases; it is also a
function of syntax (or grammar).  Syntax can change over time; so you might
need to know something about how thirteenth-century syntax differs from
contemporary syntax if you wanted to understand a letter written in the thir-
teenth century.
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Moreover, the meaning of the thirteenth-century letter is likely to be a
function of the context in which it was written, but that context is also time-
bound.  A sentence in a letter written by a baron preparing for war might
mean something different than an identical sentence in a letter written by a
bishop preparing for an ecclesiastical conclave.  The literal meaning of the
two sentences might be the same, but as lawyers well know, the full meaning
of a writing may depend on context.
All of this seems uncontroversial when the text we are interpreting is a
letter.  It is hard to imagine someone saying that we should use twenty-first-
century linguistic practices to understand a thirteenth-century text.  And it
would be very odd indeed for someone to suggest that we could better under-
stand the letter if we were to disregard the thirteenth-century context in
which it was written and instead imagine that the letter had been written
today under different circumstances.  Ignoring the time and place at which
the letter was written would seem like a strategy for deliberate
misunderstanding!
So the Fixation Thesis seems intuitively obvious, even self-evident.  But
in constitutional theory, the idea that meaning is determined by the original
communicative context and linguistic facts at the time of writing seems, at
least on the surface, to be controversial.  Some living constitutionalists
appear to deny the Fixation Thesis when they say that the meaning of the
Constitution changes over time.  Perhaps, they are arguing that an ever-evolv-
ing contemporary meaning of the constitutional text that should guide con-
stitutional practice.
But things may not be as they seem.  Perhaps living constitutionalists
actually accept that the linguistic meaning (or more precisely communicative
content) of the constitutional text is fixed, but argue that it is the legal mean-
ing (or more precisely legal content) of the Constitution that changes over
time.1  This point can be expressed more precisely as follows: living constitu-
tionalists might accept the Fixation Thesis but deny the Constraint Principle.
Or perhaps they accept both fixation and constraint, but believe that the
actual meaning of specific provisions of the constitutional text is
underdeterminate—perhaps because it is ambiguous, vague, open, or tex-
tured, or because there are gaps or contradictions in the text.  Living consti-
tutionalists might believe that changing legal content can almost always be
understood as consistent with the fixed communicative content of text.
Here is the roadmap.  We will begin, in Part I, by examining the role of
the Fixation Thesis in contemporary originalist constitutional theory.  Our
next step, in Part II, is to state the affirmative case for the Fixation Thesis.
This is the heart of this Article and readers who are looking for the gist might
limit themselves to the discussion here.  Part III explores a variety of objec-
tions to the Fixation Thesis and clarifies the content of the thesis in light of
1 On the distinction between “legal content” and “communicative content,” see Law-
rence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479
(2013).  The relationship of the Fixation Thesis to communicative content is explored in
greater depth below. See infra subsection III.A.1.
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the answers to these objections.  Several theoretical views that reject (or seem
to reject) the Fixation Thesis are examined in Part IV.  Part V applies the
Fixation Thesis to three examples, “domestic violence,” “cruel and unusual
punishment,” and “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”
The conclusion assesses the landscape of constitutional theory in light of the
arguments presented.
I. THE ROLE OF THE FIXATION THESIS IN ORIGINALIST
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
We can begin by asking what the word “originalism” means and how the
term came into being.  Once we have an understanding of originalism in
place, we can formulate a preliminary version of the Fixation Thesis and
explain the role that it plays in the constitutional theories that are members
of the originalist family.
A. What Is Originalism?
What is originalism?2  “Originalism,” the word, was coined by Paul Brest
in 1980, in a law review article entitled The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding.3  Brest stipulated the following definition: “By ‘originalism’ I
mean the familiar approach to constitutional adjudication that accords bind-
ing authority to the text of the Constitution or the intentions of its
adopters.”4
So the word “originalism” is a technical term, used in academic and
political discourse about constitutional law and theory.  Like many technical
terms, the meaning of “originalism” is a function of both stipulated defini-
tions (like Brest’s) and patterns of usage among linguistic subcommunities
(e.g., constitutional lawyers and constitutional theorists).  The possibility that
the meaning of “originalism” is subject to disagreement is considered below.5
Brest’s article did not have much to say about the content of the “famil-
iar approach” and he did not provide a list of the cases or articles to which he
was referring.  Nonetheless, there were ideas in the jurisprudential air sug-
gested by Brest’s definition.  What we might call “proto-originalist” ideas
appeared in the writings of Robert Bork,6 then-Associate Justice William
2 The answer to the question “What is originalism?” that follows draws on Lawrence B.
Solum, What Is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory, in THE CHAL-
LENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12 (Grant Huscroft
& Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011), and ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE (2011).
3 Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204
(1980) [hereinafter Brest, The Misconceived Quest].  Brest reports that he believes he coined
the term.  Email from Paul Brest, Professor Emeritus, Stanford Law School, to author (Dec.
2, 2009, 6:01 PM EST) (on file with author).
4 Brest, The Misconceived Quest, supra note 3, at 204.
5 See infra Section I.D.
6 See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1 (1971).
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Rehnquist,7 and Raoul Berger8 in the 1970s: it is not clear that these proto-
originalists actually had anything like a full-blown theory of originalism, and
their writings are a me´lange of many ideas—some of which may not be
originalist at all.
The public prominence of originalism is usually traced to a speech
before the American Bar Association, delivered in 1985 by then-Attorney
General Edwin Meese,9 who later advocated a “jurisprudence of original
intention.”10  The proto-originalists emphasized original intentions, but their
writings did not provide a theory of original meaning, nor did they have a
clear account of the role that original meaning should play in constitutional
practice.  Proto-originalism might be described as a tendency rather than a
full-fledged constitutional theory.
The proto-originalist jurisprudence of original intentions was subjected
to a sustained academic critique, with Brest’s article as the opening salvo11
and key contributions from Jefferson Powell12 and Ronald Dworkin13—and
many others too numerous to name.  Much of the criticism focused on the
difficulty of ascertaining the original intentions of a document drafted by a
multimember constitutional convention and ratified by an even larger group
who met in conventions convened in each state.  Although there were
defenders of intentionalism (notably Richard Kay14), Justice Scalia urged
originalists to “change the label from the Doctrine of Original Intent to the
Doctrine of Original Meaning.”15  Scalia’s suggestion was taken up, and the
resulting theory (which I shall call “public meaning originalism”16) was elab-
orated by Gary Lawson,17 followed by Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna
7 William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976).
8 RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (2d ed. 1977).
9 See Attorney General Edwin Meese III, Speech Before the American Bar Association
(July 9, 1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION (Paul G.
Cassel ed., 1986), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/08/23/07-
09-1985.pdf; see also Lynette Clemetson, Meese’s Influence Looms in Today’s Judicial Wars, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 17, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/17/politics/meeses-influence-
looms-in-todays-judicial-wars.html; Edwin Meese III, The Case for “Originalism”, THE HERI-
TAGE FOUNDATION (June 6, 2005), http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed060605
a.cfm.
10 Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitu-
tion, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 464–66 (1986).
11 See Brest, The Misconceived Quest, supra note 3. R
12 H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV.
885 (1985).
13 Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 470 (1981).
14 Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three
Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988).
15 Justice Antonin Scalia, Address Before the Attorney General’s Conference on Eco-
nomic Liberties in Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986), in ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRU-
DENCE: A SOURCEBOOK 101, 106 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice ed., 1987).
16 Sometimes the phrase “original public meaning originalism” is used to refer to this
view.
17 See Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 875 (1992).
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Prakash.18  In the late 1990s, Randy Barnett19 and Keith Whittington20 began
to build what has come to be called the “new originalism.”21  It was at this
stage that some originalists began to endorse the interpretation-construction
distinction, which marks the difference between the discovery of the linguis-
tic meaning of the constitutional text (“interpretation”) and the determina-
tion of the legal effect associated with the text (“construction”).22
Some new originalists (those who accepted the interpretation-construc-
tion distinction and also believed that the Constitution contains some provi-
sions that are vague or open textured) were led to the conclusion that the
original meaning of the constitutional text does not fully determine the
answers to all constitutional questions.  Thus, some new originalists posit the
existence of “construction zones”—where the resolution of constitutional dis-
putes will require judges and officials to develop constitutional doctrines and
practices on the basis of normative considerations that are not fully deter-
mined by the communicative content of the constitutional text.23
Both the interpretation-construction distinction and the construction
zone are controversial.  John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport have sug-
gested that their version of originalism, which focuses on the original meth-
ods of constitutional interpretation, can eliminate the need for constitutional
18 See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 553 (1994).
19 See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999).
20 See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUC-
TION]; KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGI-
NAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION].
21 See Barnett, supra note 19, at 620 (citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA 144 (1990); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)); Evan S. Nadel, The Amended Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 on Appeal: Reconsidering Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corporation, 1996 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 665, 691 n.191 (“An example of the ‘textualism’ to which I refer is the ‘New
Originalism’ theory often associated with Justice Scalia.”); Keith E. Whittington, The New
Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2004).
22 For an overview of the interpretation-construction distinction and the role that it
plays in contemporary originalism, see Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional
Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013) [hereinafter Solum, Originalism and Constitu-
tional Construction]; see also Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 65 (2011); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27
CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010) [hereinafter Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction].
An early use in contemporary constitutional theory can be found in Robert N. Clinton,
Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of “This Constitution”, 72 IOWA L.
REV. 1177, 1265 (1987).  The distinction first became prominent in contemporary debates
about originalism in the work of Keith Whittington, see WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTION, supra note 20; WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note
20, and subsequently in the work of Randy Barnett, see RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE
LOST CONSTITUTION (2004); Barnett, supra note 19.
23 See Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, supra note 22, at 108. R
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construction (or eliminate the construction zone).24  Gary Lawson25 and
Michael Paulsen26 have argued the construction zone can be contained or
eliminated by constitutional default rules: for example, there might be a con-
stitutional default rule that required judges to defer to the political branches
when the constitutional text does not provide a clear answer to a constitu-
tional question.27
Having set the stage through this very brief historical survey of original-
ism, we are now in a position to identify the core commitments that charac-
terize contemporary originalist constitutional theory.
B. The Originalist Family of Constitutional Theories
Contemporary originalism is a family of constitutional theories, united
by two core ideas, fixation and constraint.28  The Fixation Thesis claims the
24 John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning Fallacy, 2012 U.
ILL. L. REV. 737, 750.
25 See Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1225, 1233 (2012) (“I want
to dissent from the originalist construction project and declare the Constitution a ‘no-
construction zone.’”).
26 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpreta-
tion?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 882 (2009) (“Where the document’s broad or unspecific
language admits of a range of possible actions, consistent with the language, government
action falling within that range is not unconstitutional.”).
27 See Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, supra note 22, 511–23 (discuss-
ing Paulsen and Lawson’s default rules approach).
28 The claim that the family of theories is organized around the Fixation Thesis and
the Constraint Principle is widely accepted. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism
and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 647 n.12 (2013); Jack M. Balkin & David A.
Strauss, Response and Colloquy Concerning the Papers by Jack Balkin and David Strauss, 92 B.U.
L. REV. 1271, 1271 (2012); Ian Bartrum, Two Dogmas of Originalism, 7 WASH. U. JURIS. REV.
157 (2015); Eric Berger, Originalism’s Pretenses, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 329, 330 (2013)
(“Though originalism has changed many times since then, its proponents generally preach
these related virtues of ‘fixation’ and ‘constraint.’”); Thomas B. Colby, Originalism and the
Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1627, 1628 n.1 (2013) (quoting
Solum, supra note 2, at 36; Whittington, supra note 21, at 599); Robert J. Delahunty & John
Yoo, Saving Originalism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1103 (2015) (“[S]cholars have distin-
guished between a fixation thesis, which goes to the original linguistic meaning of constitu-
tional texts, and a normative contribution thesis, which states that ‘the linguistic meaning of
the Constitution constrains the content of constitutional doctrine.’” (quoting Lawrence B.
Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 954 (2009)
[hereinafter Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller])); Leslie C. Griffin, Hobby Lobby: The
Crafty Case that Threatens Women’s Rights and Religious Freedom, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 641,
655–56 (2015) (“New Originalism combines the ‘fixation thesis’ with the ‘constraint princi-
ple’; because ‘the [original] meaning of each constitutional provision is determined [i.e.,
fixed] at the time the text was written and adopted,’ the judge is constrained to adopt it.”
(alterations in original) (quoting Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Fidelity: Originalism and the
Possibility of Constitutional Redemption, 91 TEX. L. REV. 147, 154 (2012) (book review) [here-
inafter Solum, Faith and Fidelity])); Peter Martin Jaworski, Originalism All the Way Down.  Or:
The Explosion of Progressivism, 26 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 313, 316 (2013) (“[T]he fixation and
fidelity theses . . . constitute originalism.”); Andrew Koppelman, Originalism, Abortion, and
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original meaning (“communicative content”) of the constitutional text is
fixed at the time each provision is framed and ratified.29  The Constraint
Principle claims that constitutional actors (e.g., judges, officials, and citizens)
ought to be constrained by the original meaning when they engage in consti-
tutional practice (paradigmatically, deciding constitutional cases).30
The originalist family converges on these two core ideas, but particular
versions of originalism differ in many other respects.  For example, some
originalists focus on the original public meaning of the text, while others
believe that original meaning is determined by the original intentions of the
framers or the original methods of constitutional interpretation.  Debates
between the proponents of various forms of originalism have figured promi-
nently in recent originalist scholarship.31
Despite their differences, these originalist theories agree that the com-
municative content of the constitutional text was fixed at the time each provi-
sion was framed and ratified.  There may be slight differences in the way that
different originalists view fixation.  “Original intentions originalism” (or
“intentionalism” for short) maintains that meaning is fixed by the intentions
of the framers of the text: thus, the moment of fixation is the moment the
relevant intentions are formed, roughly the moment drafting occurs.
Originalists who focus on the understanding of the ratifiers might place the
crucial moment at a slightly later time period—the period during which rati-
fication occurs.  As a practical matter, these differences are likely to be
the Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1917, 1918 n.2 (2012); Micah Schwartzman,
What if Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1404 (2012) (“[N]early all forms of
originalism accept the fixation and textual constraint theses . . . .” (citing Lawrence B.
Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1, 4 (2011) (“[T]he fixation thesis and the textual con-
straint thesis . . . are accepted by almost every originalist thinker.”))); Lee J. Strang, An
Originalist Theory of Precedent: The Privileged Place of Originalist Precedent, 2010 BYU L. REV.
1729, 1729 n.1.  Some originalists argue fixation of original meaning and constraint by
original meaning are contingent and not necessary features of “originalism.” See Stephen
E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 881 (2015)
(“To an original-law originalist, these claims [referring to fixation and constraint] are con-
tingent, not essential to the project.  If the Founders’ interpretive rules did require the law
to update along with every change in language, then it’s just not true that the original
meaning of the original Constitution has any substantial contribution to make.” (emphasis
omitted)).  This claim is best understood as a move in a metalinguistic negotiation over
“originalism” (the word and associated concept).  For an explication of the notion of
metalinguistic negotiation, see infra text accompanying note 51.  In this article, we are
stipulating that an original methods view that rejected either fixation or constraint (contin-
gently) would not count as a form of “originalism,” but so long as the terminology is clear,
nothing substantive hangs on this point.  Of course, if the original methods did incorpo-
rate fixation and constraint (as seems likely), then original methods originalism would
count as a form of “originalism.”
29 On the Fixation Thesis, see Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller, supra note 28, at
944–47, and Solum, Faith and Fidelity, supra note 28, at 154.
30 On the Constraint Principle, see Solum, Faith and Fidelity, supra note 28, at 154–55,
and Solum, The Constraint Principle (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
31 See Solum, supra note 2 (discussing the varieties of originalism). R
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minor: framing and ratification are likely to be proximate in time, separated
by a few years at most.32  The Fixation Thesis is the main topic of this Arti-
cle—so much more will be said about its relationship to various forms of
originalism in what follows.33
Originalists also agree on the Constraint Principle—the notion that the
communicative content of the Constitution should constrain constitutional
practice, including decisions by courts and the actions of officials such as the
president and institutions such as Congress.  Most constitutional theorists
would agree that the linguistic meaning of the Constitution should make
some contribution34 to the legal content of constitutional doctrine.  For
example, Stephen Griffin and Phillip Bobbitt have suggested that constitu-
tional practice includes multiple modalities or a plurality of methods of con-
stitutional argument.35  Bobbitt’s list of modalities includes text, history,
structure, precedent, “ethos” of the American social order, and prudence.36
Pluralists can accept that the original meaning of the constitutional text
should be considered by judges who decide constitutional cases (and other
officials when they engage in constitutional interpretation and construction).
Characteristically, originalists argue that the role of original meaning is not
simply that of one factor among many; originalists typically believe that origi-
nal meaning should constrain constitutional practice.  Another way of putting
this is to say that originalists characteristically believe that the original mean-
ing is lexically prior to other modalities of constitutional interpretation and
construction.
But even if originalists agree that original meaning should play a con-
straining role in constitutional practice, they might disagree on the precise
form that constraint should take.  We can imagine a spectrum of constraint.
All or almost all originalists can agree on a minimum level constraint: the
doctrines of constitutional law and decisions in constitutional cases should be
consistent with the original meaning—subject to limited and exceptional
defeasibility conditions.37  At a maximum, we can imagine a version of the
Constraint Principle that requires that every doctrine of constitutional law be
derived directly from the constitutional text.  Because the maximalist form of
the Constraint Principle includes the minimalist form, we might think of con-
32 The Twenty-Seventh Amendment is an exception, having been submitted to the
states for ratification in 1789 and achieving ratification in 1992. See generally Richard B.
Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 61 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 497 (1992).
33 See infra Section II.C.
34 Mark Greenberg has helpfully discussed the relationship between communicative
content and legal content using the notion of contribution. See Mark Greenberg, Legislation
as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic Communication, in PHILO-
SOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 217 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames
eds., 2011).
35 See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991); Stephen M.
Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1753, 1753 (1994).
36 BOBBITT, supra note 35, at 12–13.
37 See infra text accompanying note 53.
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straint as consistency as a least common denominator, the form of constraint
upon which all originalists could agree.
The view that originalism is a family of theories united by agreement on
the core ideas of fixation and constraint has been challenged by Thomas
Colby and Peter Smith; they contend that “originalism is not a single, coher-
ent, unified theory of constitutional interpretation, but is rather a disparate
collection of distinct constitutional theories that share little more than a mis-
leading reliance on a common label.”38  While Colby and Smith are correct
to observe that there are significant differences among originalists, they are
wrong to deny that originalism has a unifying core.  That core is specified by
the Fixation Thesis and the Constraint Principle.
The significance of the core to constitutional theory is illuminated by
considering the implications of denying fixation or constraint.  Whereas
originalists contend that the fixed meaning of the constitutional text con-
strains constitutional practice, nonoriginalists argue that the original mean-
ing of the text either cannot or should not constrain our constitutional
practice, although many nonoriginalists may believe that original meaning is
a relevant factor.  This distinction between originalists and nonoriginalists
marks a deep divide: nonoriginalists can (at least in theory) endorse amend-
ing constructions of the constitutional text, whereas originalists reject such
constructions.  The power of the Supreme Court to adopt de facto amend-
ments to the Constitution is surely of great moment, both theoretically and
practically.
Because originalism is a family of theories that converge on the Fixation
Thesis and the Constraint Principle, we can approach originalism from two
distinct perspectives.  “Ecumenical originalism” seeks the common ground
between the distinctive versions of originalism.  “Sectarian originalism” devel-
ops the case for a particular version of originalism and hence the case against
rival views.  The Fixation Thesis is common ground among originalists, and
this Article advances the case for the Fixation Thesis from the perspective of
ecumenical originalism.
C. Interpretation and Construction
We have already observed that the new originalism embraces a distinc-
tion between “interpretation” and “construction.”  Let us stipulate the follow-
ing definitions to mark the distinction:
• “Constitutional interpretation” is the activity that discerns the com-
municative content (linguistic meaning) of the constitutional text.
38 Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 239 (2009).
But see Colby, supra note 28, at 1628 n.1.
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• “Constitutional construction” is the activity that determines the con-
tent of constitutional doctrine and the legal effect of the constitu-
tional text.39
The distinction between interpretation and construction goes back at
least as far as 1839 when it was articulated (but in a different from) by Franz
Lieber in his Legal and Political Hermeneutics.40  The distinction appears in
twentieth-century treatises on contract law by Corbin and Williston41 and has
been deployed in many judicial decisions.42
From the perspective of ecumenical originalism, the interpretation-con-
struction distinction itself should be uncontroversial.  It marks the concep-
tual difference between the activity of discovering the meaning of the text on
the one hand (where “meaning” is understood as neutral between public
meaning, original intent, original methods, and so forth), and the activity of
giving the constitutional text legal effect (either in the form of constitutional
doctrine or through the decision of constitutional cases).  Some originalists
may believe that the communicative content of the constitutional text is suffi-
ciently thick (or “rich”) to provide a determinate outcome in all (or almost
all) constitutional cases.  For these originalists, the interpretation-construc-
tion distinction performs two functions: (1) it provides conceptual clarity
about the (normatively legitimate) role of communicative content in consti-
tutional practice; and (2) it enables criticism of constitutional constructions
that violate the Constraint Principle.
But another group of originalists may believe that the constitutional text
is not fully determinate: they affirm what we can call “the Fact of Constitu-
tional Underdeterminacy.”  Constitutional underdeterminacy43 occurs when
39 These definitions were presented in Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construc-
tion, supra note 22, at 457.
40 FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS (1839), reprinted in 5 CLASSICS
IN LEGAL HISTORY 56 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., Wm. S. Hein & Co. 1970).
Lieber’s definition of construction is related to the definition offered here: “Construction
is the drawing of conclusions respecting subjects, that lie beyond the direct expression of
the text, from elements known and given in the text—conclusions which are in the spirit,
though not within the letter of the text.” Id.  Lieber’s formulation is ambiguous as
between two different versions of construction.  Lieber might be drawing the distinction
between semantic content and contextual enrichment, but he could also be distinguishing
between communicative content and legal content.  Lieber may not have seen the differ-
ence between these two versions of the distinction and hence may have intended to refer
to both.
41 4 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 602, at 320 (3d ed. 1961); 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: A COMPRE-
HENSIVE TREATISE ON THE RULES OF CONTRACT LAW § 534, at 7 (1960).
42 See, e.g., In re XTI Xonic Techs., Inc., 156 B.R. 821, 829 n.6 (Bankr. D. Or. 1993);
Fausel v. JRJ Enters., Inc., 603 N.W.2d 612, 618 (Iowa 1999); Berg v. Hudesman, 801 P.2d
222, 226 (Wash. 1990).  For more examples, see Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Con-
struction, supra note 22, at 30–31 (pagination of Draft 55 of August 7, 2013).
43 On the notion of “underdeterminacy,” see Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy
Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-1\NDL101.txt unknown Seq: 11  8-DEC-15 12:32
2015] the  fixation  thesis 11
the text is (1) vague, (2) open-textured (in a very broad sense44), or (3)
irreducibly ambiguous, and when there are (4) gaps or (5) contradictions in
the text.
In this context, “vagueness” and “ambiguity” can be distinguished.  A
word or expression is vague when it admits of borderline cases.  The word
“tall” is vague when used to refer to human height, because there is no
bright-line cutoff for tallness.  This is different than ambiguity: a word or
expression is ambiguous when it has more than one sense (or semantic
meaning).  For example, the word “cool” is ambiguous, because it has several
distinct senses, one related to temperature (the room is cool), another
related to temperament (he kept his cool), and yet another sense related to
personal style (she was a cool chick).  A single word or phrase can be both
ambiguous and vague—cool is ambiguous and vague in each of the senses
specified in this paragraph.  For the purposes of this Article, “open-texture”
will refer to multidimensional underdeterminacy; for example, a term may
be vague in multiple dimensions or may involve the application of multiple
criteria that are incommensurable.45
The constitutional text contains many words and phrases that would be
ambiguous if considered acontextually.  The word “state” can refer to nation
states, to “states of affairs,” or to the several states of the United States: in
context, it is clear that the Constitution uses the word “state” in the last of
these three senses.  Vagueness is different.  Although it is possible that a
seemingly “vague” word or expression will become determinate in a particu-
lar context, this is not always the case.  Even after context is considered,
vague terms in the Constitution may continue to underdetermine the con-
tent of constitutional doctrine and the outcome of constitutional cases.  For
example, Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution use the phrases “legislative
power,” “executive power,” and “judicial power.”  Although there are clear
cases of each kind of power, there are also borderline cases.  The Affordable
Care Act may be a clear case of legislation, but the President’s Executive
Order46 suspending the deportation of young undocumented persons who
44 I am using the phrase “open-texture” in a stipulated sense that encompasses to
include (but not necessarily limited to) the following: (1) terms that express family resem-
blance concepts; (2) terms that express multi-criterial concepts where the criteria are
incommensurable; and (3) terms that express concepts that involve multi-dimensional
vagueness.
45 On multidimensional incommensurability, see Hrafn Asgeirsson, On the Instrumental
Value of Vagueness in the Law, 125 ETHICS 425, 429–31 (2015).
46 For a description of the program and its current legal status, see Consideration of
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://
www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca (last
visited Nov. 5, 2015).
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came to the United States as children might be a borderline case47—neither
clearly executive nor clearly legislative in nature.48
The Fact of Constitutional Underdeterminacy creates construction
zones—particular fact patterns and general issues of constitutional doctrine
where the communicative content of the constitutional text does not answer
our constitutional questions.  In the construction zone, interpretation would
run out and we would be required resort to constitutional construction to
provide the content of constitutional doctrine and to decide constitutional
cases.  (But we should not be misled by the construction zone metaphor:
construction gives the constitutional content legal effect, even those in which
the constitutional text itself fully determines the content of constitutional
doctrine.49)
Some originalists affirm the existence of construction zones while others
deny them.  As a consequence, there will be disagreement among originalists
about the implications of the interpretation-construction distinction differ-
ently.  Nonetheless, from an ecumenical perspective, all originalists can
affirm the conceptual distinction between meaning and effect that grounds
the conceptual distinction between interpretation (communicative content)
and construction (legal effect).
There is one more important point to be made about the interpretation-
construction distinction.  Interpretation is an empirical inquiry.  The com-
municative content of a text is determined by linguistic facts (facts about
conventional semantic meanings and syntax) and by facts about the context
in which the text was written.  Interpretations are either true or false—
although in some cases we may not have sufficient evidence to show that a
particular interpretation is true or false.  Constructions are justified by nor-
mative considerations.  This is true even in the cases where the constructions
seem compelled by the meaning of the text.  Article I of the Constitution
provides that each state is represented by two senators: this is a case where
interpretation of the text is easy and hence the construction (legal effect) to
be given to the text seems obvious and intuitive.  But if we ask why we ought
to give the constitutional text the effect that follows naturally from the mean-
ing of the word “two,” our answer must be some normative consideration.
For example, we might believe that we are obligated to follow the clear direc-
tives of the constitutional text, because the United States Constitution was
adopted by “We the People” and hence has democratic legitimacy.  In the
construction zone, we will need some theory of constitutional construction to
give legal effect to the underdeterminate constitutional text.  That theory
might provide a general default rule (resolve underdeterminacy in favor of
actions by elected officials), or it might require consideration of first-order
normative concerns (resolve underdeterminacy so as to achieve justice).
47 To be clear, I am not asserting that this is a borderline case.  To make out that
claim, we would need to examine the relevant linguistic and contextual facts.
48 For further discussion, see Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, supra
note 22, at 470.
49 Id. at 506–07.
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D. Working Definitions of “Originalism” and “Living Constitutionalism”
We need to accomplish one more task before we can formulate the Fixa-
tion Thesis.  The words “originalism,” “nonoriginalism,” and “living constitu-
tionalism” are used differently by different authors in different contexts.  In
political discourse and the popular press, “originalism” may not be well-
defined—or defined in a cartoon version such as “originalism is the view that
contemporary cases should be decided the way that James Madison and Alex-
ander Hamilton would have decided them” or “originalism is the conserva-
tive approach to constitutional interpretation.”  Even in academic discourse,
“originalism” may not be well-defined.  Progressive constitutional theorists
who self-identify as “living constitutionalists” may define originalism in a dif-
ferent way than do originalists.  And originalists may themselves differ about
the dividing line between theories that should count as forms of “original-
ism” and those that should be considered “nonoriginalist.”  And this may
result in disagreement about the meaning of the word “originalism.”50
In the philosophy of language, the phrase “metalinguistic negotiation”51
is used to refer to the process by which the meaning of words like “original-
ism” and phrases like “living constitutionalism” are contested (adversarially)
or negotiated (cooperatively).  Sometimes metalinguistic negotiation may be
explicit, but frequently the disagreement about meaning may be implicit.
Given disagreement about what should count as originalism, we need some
way to proceed.  The simplest way is to stipulate definitions—with the caveat
that the stipulated definitions could be contested.
In this Article, I will use the words “originalism,” “nonoriginalism,” and
“living constitutionalism” in the following stipulated senses:
• Originalism: The family of constitutional theories that affirm (implic-
itly or explicitly) the Fixation Thesis and the Constraint Principle
that offer some plausible account of “original meaning” (such as pub-
lic meaning or original intent).
• Nonoriginalism: The family of constitutional theories that deny either
the Fixation Thesis or the Constraint Principle or both.  There are
two distinctive forms of nonoriginalism, interpretive and
constructive:
(1) Interpretive nonoriginalism is the view that the communicative content of
the constitutional text changes over time: someone who held the view that
the meaning of the Constitution is the contemporary plain meaning of the
text would be an interpretive nonoriginalist.
50 For discussion of lines between originalism, nonoriginalism, and living constitution-
alism, see Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, supra note 22, at 534, tbl.1.
51 See David Plunkett & Tim Sundell, Antipositivist Arguments from Legal Thought and
Talk: The Metalinguistic Response, in PRAGMATISM, LAW, AND LANGUAGE 56–75 (Graham
Hubbs & Douglas Lind eds., 2014); David Plunkett & Tim Sundell, Disagreement and the
Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms, 13 PHILOSOPHERS’ IMPRINT 1, 3 (Dec. 2013);
David Plunkett & Timothy Sundell, Dworkin’s Interpretivism and the Pragmatics of Legal Dis-
putes, 19 LEGAL THEORY 242, 248 (2013).
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(2) Constructive nonoriginalism is the view that the legal content of constitu-
tional doctrine does not constrain (but may contribute to) the legal content
of constitutional doctrine.  Someone who holds the view that judges may
adopt constitutional constructions that override the communicative content
of the constitutional text would be a constructive nonoriginalist.
• Living constitutionalism: Refers to the view that the content of consti-
tutional doctrine ought to change over time; some living constitu-
tionalists believe that the changes in doctrine should respond to
changes in circumstances and values.
Given these definitions, the formulation of the Constraint Principle is
particularly important.  In other work, this topic is explored in depth,52 but
for the purposes of this discussion, we need that version of the Constraint
Principle that all or almost all originalists could agree is necessary for a the-
ory to count as originalist—recognizing that some originalists may believe
that a more robust form of constraint is required by the best version of
originalism.
Let us call the minimalist version of the Constraint Principle “Constraint
as Consistency” and stipulate the following formulation:
• Constraint as Consistency: Constraint as consistency imposes two
requirements on constitutional practice:
(1) the set of operative constitutional doctrines must be consistent with the
set that would directly translate the communicative content of the text into
doctrine (the “direct translation set”) and the decision of constitutional
cases must be consistent with that set; and
(2) all of the communicative content of the constitutional text must be
reflected in the legal content of constitutional doctrine.53
So for the purposes of this Article, theories that assign original meaning
an important but nonconstraining role will not be considered “originalist” in
the stipulated sense of originalism.
52 See Solum, The Constraint Principle, supra note 30.
53 See Lawrence B. Solum, Construction and Constraint: Discussion of Living Originalism, 7
JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 17, 22 (2013) (with “communicative content” substituted for
the original “linguistic meaning”).
In Constraint as Consistency, the word “consistency” means logical consistency in the
following sense: actual content of constitutional doctrine must not contradict the legal
content that would follow from the direct translation set (the doctrine that would obtain if
the communicative content were directly translated into legal content).  The second part
of the minimalist formulation of the Constraint Principle requires more than non-contra-
diction: it adds the requirement that all of the communicative content must be translated
into legal content—in other words, all of the provisions of the Constitution (that have not
been implicitly or explicitly repealed by amendment) must be given legal effect.  The Mini-
malist Formulation of the Constraint Principle requires that the content of constitutional
doctrine be consistent with the core of settled meaning (that is, the zone of constitutional
determinacy).  The Minimalist Formulation thus allows for nonoriginalist considerations to
operate in the Construction Zone.  This is an incomplete explication of the Constraint
Principle, which is not the subject of this Article.  In a work in progress, tentatively entitled
The Constraint Principle, I provide a more complete explication.
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E. Formulating the Fixation Thesis
Given our understanding of originalism as a family of constitutional the-
ories that agree on constraint and fixation and the interpretation-construc-
tion distinction, we are now in a position to formulate a more precise version
of the Fixation Thesis.  We can begin with a statement of the fully elaborated
version and then proceed to analysis of its elements:
The Fixation Thesis: The object of constitutional interpretation is the commu-
nicative content of the constitutional text, and that content was fixed when
each provision was framed and/or ratified.
The thesis can be unpacked by providing an explanation for each of its
major elements:
The Object of Constitutional Interpretation: The Fixation Thesis is a claim
about constitutional interpretation—in the sense of “interpretation” speci-
fied by the interpretation-construction distinction.  That is, the Fixation The-
sis is a thesis about the activity of discovering the communicative content of
the constitutional text.  By itself, the Fixation Thesis does not make a claim
about the legal content of constitutional doctrine or the decision of constitu-
tional cases.  Such claims require some version of the Constraint Principle
and information about the communicative content of particular constitu-
tional provisions.  Thus, the Fixation Thesis does not claim that the commu-
nicative content of the constitutional text ought to be decisive in
constitutional construction.
The Communicative Content of the Constitutional Text: The Fixation Thesis is
a claim about the communicative content of the authoritative version of the
constitutional text.54  The phrase “communicative content” is used to pro-
vide a more precise formulation than “meaning” or “linguistic meaning.”
The use of the phrase “communicative content” is intended to be neutral as
between various theories of that content, e.g., original public meaning versus
original intentions (and other theories).  The authoritative version of the
text is the particular instance of the writing that was officially promulgated.55
And That Content Was Fixed: It is the communicative content that is fixed
at the time of origination.  Communicative content is not legal content or
legal effect.  Therefore, the Fixation Thesis is not a claim about the fixation
of constitutional doctrine or the fixation of constitutional practice.  The
notion of “fixation” employed in the Fixation Thesis is intended to be thin,
rather than thick.56  Different accounts of meaning in the philosophy of lan-
54 By “authoritative,” I mean the version of the text that we take as the official ver-
sion—for example, the version of the Constitution signed in 1787 by the Delegates to the
Philadelphia Convention.  By using the word “authoritative” in this way, I do not mean to
smuggle in a further claim that this version should constrain legal practice.  Originalists do
make that claim in the form of the Constraint Principle, but that principle must be justi-
fied by normative arguments.  It certainly cannot simply be assumed.
55 As discussed below, the official version is a token and not a type. See infra subsection
III.A.2.
56 The notion of “thick” and “thin” deployed here is borrowed from Rawls. See JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 396 (1971) (discussing the theory of the good).
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guage may produce slightly different accounts of how fixation occurs and
what fixation means.  For each such account, there will be a thick theory of
fixation, but the Fixation Thesis itself is neutral as between such accounts.
When Each Provision Was Framed and/or Ratified: The Fixation Thesis
claims that fixation occurs during a timeframe: “when each provision of the
Constitution was framed and/or ratified.”  The use of “and/or” is intended
to reflect theoretical disagreement about the precise moment of fixation,
with some originalists endorsing the moment at which the text was created
(framing) and others endorsing the moment at which the text became legally
operative (ratification).
The precise formulation of the Fixation Thesis and the explanation of its
elements reveal an important characteristic of the defense of the Fixation
Thesis offered here.  Just as originalism is a family of constitutional theories
united by the Fixation Thesis and the Constraint Principle, originalists could
affirm a variety of slightly different views about fixation.  The formulation of
the Fixation Thesis offered here is intended to be ecumenical; it is formu-
lated to be as neutral as possible with respect to the variations between these
views.  Of course, in the end, only one version of the Fixation Thesis can be
correct.  Nonetheless, the argument for the Fixation Thesis offered here will
show that fixation is well supported even when accounting for the theoretical
disagreements among originalists and among philosophers of language.
F. A Preliminary Example: Domestic Violence, Take One
The classic example of the Fixation Thesis in action is the reference in
the Constitution to “domestic violence.”57  This example will be discussed
twice.  At this point, it will be used as a preliminary example—to illustrate the
gist (or commonsense version) of the argument for the thesis.  Towards the
end of this Article, the domestic violence example will be analyzed again in
light of the various complexities introduced by a full statement of the case for
the Fixation Thesis.
The Constitution of 1789 uses the phrase “domestic violence”: “The
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form
of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature can-
not be convened) against domestic Violence.”58
The contemporary semantic meaning of “domestic violence” is “ ‘inti-
mate partner abuse,’ ‘battering,’ or ‘wife-beating,’” and it is understood to be
“physical, sexual, psychological, and economic abuse that takes place in the
context of an intimate relationship, including marriage.”59  But if that mean-
57 Mark S. Stein, The Domestic Violence Clause in ‘New Originalist’ Theory, 37 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 129 (2009).
58 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, cl. 4.
59 Glossary, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (Sept. 2003), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/
nepal0903/3.htm; see also Emily J. Sack, The Domestic Relations Exception, Domestic Violence,
and Equal Access to Federal Courts, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1441 (2006).
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ing had been unknown in the late eighteenth century, it would simply be a
linguistic mistake to interpret the domestic violence clause of Article IV of
the Constitution of 1789 as referring to spouse or child abuse.  The anachro-
nistic reading of “domestic violence” would be mistaken because the seman-
tic content is fixed at the time of “constitutional utterance,” where that
phrase is understood as referring to the time of origin, encompassing the
period roughly contemporaneous with the framing (or drafting) and ratifica-
tion (or formal legal approval) of the particular clause or amendment.60
The point of the domestic violence example is illuminated by consider-
ing the general phenomenon of “linguistic drift.”  Words and phrases
acquire new meanings over time.  This phenomenon can be illustrated by
returning to the example of the thirteenth-century letter discussed earlier.
Suppose, for example, that we are attempting to determine the semantic con-
tent of a letter written in the twelfth century that uses the term “deer.”  Over
time, the meaning of the term “deer” has substantially changed.  Today,
“deer” refers to a ruminant mammal belonging to the family Cervidae, and a
number of broadly similar animals from related families within the order
Artiodactyla are often also called deer.  But in Middle English, the word
“deer” meant a beast or animal of any kind.61  An ordinary letter written
between 1066 and the fifteenth century that employed the term “deer” can
only be understood reliably in light of the conventional semantic meaning at
the time of writing: to read the letter as using the term “deer” to refer exclu-
sively to a mammal belonging to the family Cervidae would be to make a type
of factual error, i.e., a linguistic mistake.62  Although I have used an example
involving a writing (a letter), this feature is not essential to fixation.  The
communicative content of a twelfth-century oral communication using the
word “deer” would also be given by usage in Middle English.63
The phrase “domestic violence” and the word “deer” both illustrate the
general phenomenon of linguistic drift.  Words and phrases change meaning
over time.  When we interpret a particular communication (a written text or
an oral saying), the communicative content is a function of the meaning at
60 I owe this example to Jack Balkin. See Lawrence B. Solum, Blogging from APSA: The
New Originalism, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Sept. 3, 2007), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legalthe-
ory/2007/09/blogging-from-a.html (live blogging at the meeting of the American Political
Science Association and describing Balkin’s presentation); JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING
ORIGINALISM 37 (2011).
61 SOL STEINMETZ, SEMANTIC ANTICS: HOW AND WHY WORDS CHANGE MEANING 49–50
(2008).
62 Of course, the term “deer” in Middle English included what we call deer in contem-
porary usage, and it might be clear in context that a particular letter used the Middle-
English term to refer to a modern deer.  Such usages seem likely to have been a part of the
causal chain that resulted in the contemporary usage.  The mistake would be to assume
that the Middle-English term was limited to the modern usage.  The mistake would result
in a gross misunderstanding where the Middle-English term was used to refer to what we
call a “cow” or a “pig.”
63 Since there were no sound recordings in the twelfth century, we could only know of
such an utterance through a contemporaneous written report.
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the time the communication was produced.  Meaning is fixed for another
reason: the communicative content of an utterance is also a function of con-
text, and context is time-bound as well.64
G. The Shape of Current Debates over Originalism
What role does the Fixation Thesis play in contemporary debates over
originalism?  It is perhaps unsurprising that there is no clear answer to this
question.  Living constitutionalists and nonoriginalists usually see themselves
as opposed to originalism.  If originalism is the family of constitutional theo-
ries that affirm the Fixation Thesis and the Constraint Principle, then one
can oppose originalism in three distinct ways.  One can deny the Fixation
Thesis but accept the Constraint Principle.  Or accept the Fixation Thesis
and deny the Constraint Principle.  Or deny both.
Many (or most) living constitutionalists and nonoriginalists seem to
focus their attack on the Constraint Principle—although they may not use
that phrase to describe the feature of originalism to which they object.  This
form of nonoriginalism is illustrated by at least one understanding of the
multiple modalities, or pluralist, approach exemplified by Bobbitt and Grif-
fin.  We can illustrate pluralism (multiple modalities) via the following dia-
gram (Figure 165):
FIGURE 1: MULTIPLE MODALITIES
Constitutional
Interpretation
& Construction
Historical
Textual
Structural Doctrinal
Ethical
Prudential
64 See infra subsection II.C.2.b.
65 Figure 1 was first presented in Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction,
supra note 22, at 481.
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The multiple modalities view of constitutional interpretation and con-
struction views the text (or more precisely the communicative content of the
text) as one of several moves that can be made in the complex argumentative
practice of constitutional law.  We can imagine a version of this approach
that explicitly accepts the Fixation Thesis.  Thus, arguments from the com-
municative content of the text could accept the originalist claim that the con-
tent is fixed at the time of framing and ratification.  But this version of the
multiple modalities view rejects the Constraint Principle.  Text is simply one
of the modalities of constitutional argument.  Textual arguments might be
defeated by compelling arguments from one of the other modalities, e.g., by
arguments from prudential concerns or by ethical arguments.
Nonoriginalists or living constitutionalists who accept fixation but deny
constraint are likely to see an elaborate defense of the Fixation Thesis as a bit
of a tempest in a teapot.  We might imagine such a nonoriginalist saying,
“OK, you’ve convinced me about fixation.  But that is not where the action is.
The action is all in debates about the Constraint Principle.”  In some sense,
this is correct.  Once the Fixation Thesis is established firmly, much of the
action will shift to the Constraint Principle.  But as we shall see, not every
nonoriginalist believes that the Fixation Thesis is obvious and
noncontroversial.66
Consider a nonoriginalist who denies fixation (or seems to deny it).  I
will use Ronald Dworkin as the inspiration for my fixation-denying
nonoriginalist, although Dworkin’s views are complex and their relationship
to the Fixation Thesis is open to dispute.  We can begin our explication of a
Dworkin-like view with the concept-conception distinction.67  Some concepts,
like “right” or “good,” seem to be the subject of theoretical disagreement.
Utilitarians and Kantians, for example, have very different views about what
makes an action “right”—they disagree about the criteria for rightness and
hence about which actions are right and which are wrong.  One way of
understanding their disagreement distinguishes between the concept of right-
ness and particular conceptions of that concept.
Our Dworkin-like nonoriginalist might argue that the United States Con-
stitution employs concepts but does not specify particular conceptions of
those concepts.  For example, the Eighth Amendment forbids “cruel and
unusual punishments.”  Putting aside “unusual,” let us suppose that the pro-
hibition applied to all “cruel” punishments.  Our Dworkin-like nonoriginalist
might argue that the Eighth Amendment uses the general concept of cruelty,
but does not specify a particular conception of that concept.  Cruelty is a
contested concept and our conceptions of cruelty may change over time.
Hence, the meaning of cruelty is not fixed but changes over time.
Of course, this is only a toy version of a nonoriginalist theory that denies
the Fixation Thesis.  The point of introducing this Dworkin-like nonoriginal-
66 See infra Section III.B.
67 The distinction is from W. B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SOC. 167 (1956).  It was later deployed by John Rawls. RAWLS, supra note 56,
at 5.
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ist theory is to illustrate the role that disputes about fixation may play in
contemporary constitutional debate.  At this stage in the argument, our aim
is simply to show that the Fixation Thesis could be in dispute.  We will investi-
gate the concept-conception distinction and its implications for the thesis in
detail below,68 and return to Dworkin’s view, which he calls “constructive
interpretation,” when we investigate the rivals of fixation.69
II. THE AFFIRMATIVE CASE FOR THE FIXATION THESIS
The affirmative case for the Fixation Thesis can be articulated via intui-
tive and commonsense observations about the nature of written communica-
tion.  If we want to know what a text means and the text was not written very
recently, we need to be aware of the possibility that it uses language some-
what differently than we do now.  Moreover, meaning is in part a function of
context—and context is time-bound.  So if we want to know what a text
means, we need to investigate the context in which the text was produced.  In
this Part, these simple ideas are elaborated.
A. The Meaning of “Meaning”
Informally stated, the Fixation Thesis claims that the meaning of the
constitutional text is fixed at the time of framing and ratification.  But what
does the word “meaning” mean?  In the legal context, the word “meaning” is
ambiguous and it can be used in at least three distinct (but related) senses.70
Sometimes when we ask about the “meaning” of a legal text, we are ask-
ing about the implications it will have, usually in a particular context.  For
example, we might ask, “What does First Amendment freedom of speech
mean for my defamation suit?  Does it provide me a defense?”  When “mean-
ing” is used in this sense in the context of a legal text, we are concerned with
the application of the text to particular case or to some set of cases.  We can
call this meaning in the applicative sense.
“Meaning” is also used to refer to the purpose or motive that produced a
particular legal text.  For example, we might ask about the aim of a constitu-
tional provision by saying, “What did the drafters mean to accomplish
through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment?”  We can call this meaning in the purposive sense.
Finally, “meaning” can be used in the sense of the communicative con-
tent of a legal text.  We sometimes call this “linguistic meaning.”  For exam-
ple, we might ask what the framers meant by using the phrase “arms” in the
68 See infra subsection III.B.1.
69 See infra Section IV.B.
70 On the ambiguity of “meaning,” see C.K. OGDEN & I.A. RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF
MEANING 286–87 (1923) (exploring different senses of “meaning”); Michael L. Geis, On
Meaning: The Meaning of Meaning in Law, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1125 (1995); A.P. Martinich,
Four Senses of ‘Meaning’ in the History of Ideas: Quentin Skinner’s Theory of Historical Interpreta-
tion, 3 J. PHIL. HIST. 225 (2009).
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Second Amendment: Were they referring to weapons or the upper limbs of
the human body?  We can call this meaning in the communicative sense.
The Fixation Thesis is a claim about meaning in the communicative
sense: what is fixed is communicative content.  It is not a claim about the
purposes for which the text was adopted—although those purposes are time-
bound (since the purpose for an action is set when the action is performed).
And the Fixation Thesis is not a claim about the correct applications of the
constitutional text to particular fact patterns or to general types of fact pat-
terns—although the fixed communicative content may be given legal effect
that determines or partially determines such applications.
Because the meaning of “meaning” is ambiguous in the way we have just
specified, the Fixation Thesis can easily be misunderstood.  If the Fixation
Thesis were a claim about meaning in the applicative sense, it might be
understood as the claim that all future applications of the constitutional text
are fixed at the time the text is framed and ratified.  This claim seems implau-
sible for a variety of reasons.  Constitutionally relevant facts may change over
time.  Do the freedoms of speech and press apply to the Internet?  If the
application of these provisions had been fixed at the time they were framed
and ratified, the implication would seem to be that somehow a text written in
1791 had the future of communication technology baked in.  Does infrared
surveillance constitute a search?  It seems implausible to believe that the
answer to this question was fixed when the Fourth Amendment was framed
and ratified.
Of course, the fixed communicative content of the constitutional text
can, when combined with facts about the world, determine (or partially
determine) the outcome of particular cases.  But the facts about the world to
which the constitutional text can be applied are not themselves fixed at the
time the text is written.  We might summarize this idea in the following way:
the communicative content of the constitutional text is fixed at the time of framing and
ratification, but the facts to which the text can be applied change over time.
B. The Fixation Thesis and Communication Generally
The best way to grasp the Fixation Thesis is to consider the role of fixa-
tion in ordinary communication.  Fixation is a very general phenomenon—
and not something special about the constitutional text.
1. The Generalized Fixation Thesis
The generalized version of the Fixation Thesis might be stated as
follows:
Generalized Fixation Thesis: The communicative content of a communica-
tion (oral or written, verbal or nonverbal) is fixed at the time the communi-
cation occurs.
This idea can undoubtedly be formulated in a variety of other ways, but
the Generalized Fixation Thesis expresses our commonsense understanding
of how meaning works.  When I give a lecture, the communicative content of
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my lecture comes into being then—and not at some later time.  It would be
strange to think that the content of my lecture changes after the lecture
ends, and even more strange to think that a lecture that I gave in 2013 would
acquire a new meaning (in the communicative sense) if linguistic practices
were to change gradually over the decades so that words I used then have
totally difference semantic content in 2089.
One of the difficulties with thinking about the Fixation Thesis in the
constitutional context is that debates about the meaning of the constitution
are normatively charged.  This is clear in the case of specific provisions: most
readers are likely to agree that the normative stakes in debates about the
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause are high.  And because much is rid-
ing on the meaning of particular provisions of the constitutional text,
debates about constitutional interpretation and construction, even in
abstract terms, may elicit motivated reasoning.  Seeing ahead to the implica-
tions of a constitutional theory for issues upon which they are committed,
constitutional theorists find themselves engaging in motivated reasoning—
striving to reach the theoretical conclusion that underwrites their normative
preferences about the content of constitutional doctrine.
The Generalized Fixation Thesis points to more prosaic examples,
where fixation is intuitively obvious and unlikely to be controversial.  Thus, if
you are reading a thirteenth-century letter that uses the word “deer” and you
learn that “deer” meant four-legged mammal at the time the letter was writ-
ten, you are very likely to accept this linguistic fact as crucially important to
understanding the letter.71  Similarly, if you were reading a book of recipes
written in the eighteenth century and your learned that “kale” was the eight-
eenth-century word for what we now call “radishes,” you would be very
unlikely to insist that the recipe actually referred to the acephala group of
brassica oleracea, the green or purple leafed vegetable, which is quite unlike
what we call a “radish.”  Of course, you might be inspired to try the recipe
with some leaves from a plant in the acephala group of brassica oleracea, but
that would be an experimental deviation from the recipe and not a case of
following the recipe.72
Just to be clear, the Fixation Thesis claims that meaning (communicative
content) itself is fixed and not our beliefs about meaning.  So it might well be
the case that someone would read the old recipe and believe that it referred
to what we now call “kale.”  And then they might learn of their mistake, and
their belief about the meaning of the recipe might change.  Communicative
content is fixed; beliefs about communicative content can change.  Similarly,
the Fixation Thesis makes no claim about constraint.  Thus, a modern cook
might disregard the linguistic fact that the old recipe used what we know call
“radishes” and substitute what we now call “kale.”  This result might be deli-
71 See supra text accompanying note 61.
72 The example is inspired by Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85
GEO. L.J. 1823, 1825 (1997).  The “deer” example reflects actual linguistic drift.  The “kale”
example is hypothetical.
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cious or awful, but it would not be the dish contemplated by the meaning
(communicative content) of the recipe.
2. The Mechanisms of Fixation
The Generalized Fixation Thesis is a function of two distinct mecha-
nisms by which communication occurs.  First, when authors or speakers
attempt to convey meaning to readers or listeners, they can take advantage of
conventional semantic meanings and the rules (or regularities) of syntax and
grammar.  Second, the contextual enrichment of semantic content is deter-
mined by the context at the time communication occurs.  Each of these two
mechanisms requires further explanation.
a. Conventional Semantic Meaning and Linguistic Drift
The first mechanism is the fixation of conventional semantic meaning by
linguistic facts at the time a communication occurs.  Thus, as I write this sen-
tence, I rely on the conventional semantic meanings of the words and
phrases comprised by the sentence and the grammatical relationships
between these units of meaning.  Conventional semantic meanings are time-
bound: because of the phenomenon of linguistic drift, the words that I am
using now (as I write in 2015) could change—as could the syntactic regulari-
ties that we sometimes call “rules of grammar.”  The relevant linguistic facts
upon which I rely are facts about patterns of usage in 2015.  It is difficult to
even imagine how I could communicate on the basis of conventional seman-
tic meanings that do not yet exist—setting science-fiction scenarios aside.73
To the extent that meaning is conveyed using conventional semantic mean-
ings and regularities of syntax, meaning is fixed by linguistic facts as they
exist at the time a text is written (or a speech is made).
A few examples of linguistic drift may illuminate these ideas.  In the thir-
teenth century, “abode” meant the act of staying, whereas it now refers to
homes or dwellings.74  We now use the word “average” to refer to what math-
ematicians call the “mean” or “arithmetic mean,” but in the fifteenth century
73 There may be methods to accomplish the trick of using semantic meanings that
become conventional in the future.  For example, one might write a novel that uses new
vocabulary.  If the novel is widely read, it might change linguistic practices.  Anthony Bur-
gess’s novel, A Clockwork Orange, which uses invented vocabulary, might be an example of
this, or one could imagine that it could have been an example. See ANTHONY BURGESS, A
CLOCKWORK ORANGE (1963).  Suppose that “Nadsat”—the dialect that Burgess invented for
the novel—caught on and became standard, but that the novel itself were forgotten.  If
Burgess were to have put a letter in a time capsule that used the new vocabulary, the use of
terms like “droog” and “eggiweg” would be understood by future readers—although they
might be baffled by the use of the new vocabulary in the old text.  On Burgess’s linguistics,
see Marina Oks, The Rebus of “Nadsat,” or, A Key to A Clockwork Orange, in TEXTUAL INTRICA-
CIES: ESSAYS ON STRUCTURE AND INTERTEXTUALITY IN NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURY
FICTION IN ENGLISH 37 (Christiane Bimberg & Igor Volkov eds., 2009).
74 See STEINMETZ, supra note 61, at 1–2.
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it referred to a tax or duty leveled on the shipment of goods.75  Linguistic
drift is one of the reasons that the fixation is important.  The Generalized
Fixation Thesis properly directs us to read a text using the linguistic informa-
tion that was available to the author and readers at the time the text was
written.
The phenomenon of linguistic drift can be further clarified by consider-
ing some of the mechanisms that are responsible for changes in the mean-
ings of words and phrases.  Linguistic drift frequently occurs as the result of a
mistaken usage that “takes off” and eventually becomes standard, but it might
occur as the result of deliberate repurposing of a word.76  For example, the
word “satellite” originally meant a bodyguard, but Johannes Kepler adapted
this word to refer to the moons of Jupiter, and then Jules Verne tweaked
Kepler’s usage to refer to imaginary man-made devices orbiting the earth.
Verne’s usage was then applied to Sputnik, an actual version of Verne’s fic-
tional device.77  That usage of satellite eventually became standard.  Today,
no one uses the word “satellite” to refer to bodyguards.
To the extent that meaning is conveyed by the conventional semantic
meanings of words and phrases, the relevant meanings are fixed by linguistic
facts at the time the words or phrases are employed.  If you wanted the cor-
rect interpretation of a ship’s log from the fifteenth century, you would trans-
late “average” as a tax or duty and not as a reference to an arithmetic mean.
If you were reading a historical account of the security measures for the king
of France written in the sixteenth century, you would understand that “satel-
lites” were bodyguards and not some early version of the Death Star ready to
fry English assassins with high-energy particle beams.  If you want to know
what Shakespeare meant by “Sweet friends, your patience for my long abode;
Not I, but my affairs, have made you wait”78 you would do well to follow the
usage of Shakespeare’s time: “long abode” does not refer to an elongated
dwelling.
In sum, the first mechanism of fixation is semantic.  The semantic con-
tent of a writing is fixed by linguistic facts about patterns of usage at the time
the text is authored.79  Subsequent linguistic drift does not change the mean-
ing of a prior writing, although it could result in changing beliefs about that
meaning.
b. Contextual Enrichment and the Time-Boundedness of Context
The second mechanism by which meaning is produced is context.  Con-
ventional semantic meaning is a powerful tool for communication, but its
power is not unlimited.  Consider the second independent clause of the sen-
75 Id. at 13.
76 For a brief account, see id. at vii–xii.
77 See id. at 200.
78 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 2, sc. 6.
79 This assumes, of course, that conventional semantic meanings are being employed
and not being used as code words for the conventional semantic meanings usually repre-
sented by other words.
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tence immediately prior to this one: “its power is not unlimited.”  The seman-
tic content of this clause is ambiguous—it could mean many different things.
That ambiguity is brought out by imbedding the same clause in a different
sentence: “The Tesla Model S has a powerful battery, but its power is not unlim-
ited.”  The clause means two different things in the two contexts.  The origi-
nal occurrence of the clause refers to the capacity of conventional semantic
meanings to convey communicative content; the second occurrence of the
clause is about the capacity of the electrical batteries of the Tesla Model S to
propel the automobile at high speeds for long distances.  The context in
which a writing occurs is time-bound.  Thus, the communicative content of
the first occurrence of the clause I have been discussing (“its power is not
unlimited”) is in part determined by contextual facts that are fixed once I
have completed the writing of this Article.
3. The Argument from the Generalized Fixation Thesis to Fixation of the
Communicative Content of the Constitutional Text
The Generalized Fixation Thesis follows from the fact that conventional
semantic meanings and contextual facts are time-bound.  The meaning of
language changes over time, and as a consequence, the meaning of a com-
munication depends in part on the way language is used at the time the com-
munication occurs.  The meaning of a writing or saying is in part a function
of the context in which the communication occurs; the relevant context is
the context at the time of writing or saying.
Legal communication is distinctive in various ways, but it is still commu-
nication.  If we want to understand a judicial decision from the sixteenth
century, we will need to know about sixteenth-century linguistic facts and the
sixteenth-century context in which the decision was written.  If we want to
understand a contract written in 2013, we should pay attention to the conven-
tional meanings that contract terms have in the twenty-first century and the
contemporary context in which the contract was written.  If we want to under-
stand the communicative content of Warren Court cases, we will need to
know how language was used in the fifties and sixties and understand the
legal and political context in which the Warren Court’s opinions were writ-
ten.  Legal communication uses conventional semantics and syntax and con-
text to produce meaning—and for this reason, the Generalized Fixation
Thesis holds for legal communications.
Constitutional communication is simply a form of communication and a
particular subspecies of legal communication.  If the Fixation Thesis holds
for communication generally and for legal communication in particular,
then it would be somewhat mysterious if it did not hold for constitutional
communication.  Conventional semantic meanings and regularities of syntax
and grammar, when combined with context, provide an account of how com-
munication is possible.  We can convey meaning because words and phrases
are used in regular ways and can be combined using regular patterns of syn-
tax and grammar.  We can deliver more content still by relying on our read-
ers’ knowledge of the communicative context.  But once we understand these
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mechanisms, they imply fixation.  Anyone who accepts the Generalized Fixa-
tion Thesis but denies that the communicative content of the constitutional
text is fixed owes us an explanation.  How does constitutional communica-
tion occur?  How do we understand the words and phrases and combine
them into meaningful clauses?  What is the context of constitutional commu-
nication if it isn’t time-bound?
C. Fixation as a Thesis Internal to Particular Versions of Originalism
With the generalized Fixation Thesis in place, we can now examine the
way that fixation occurs within various versions of originalism.  Recall that
originalism is a family of constitutional theories that cluster around the Fixa-
tion Thesis and the Constraint Principle.  One of the ways that versions of
originalism differ is that they offer different accounts of how the communica-
tive content of the Constitution is produced.  As a result, these different ver-
sions of originalism have different accounts of how and when fixation occurs.
We can begin with original intentions originalism (or “intentionalism” for
short).
1. Fixation and the Original Intentions of the Framers
Intentionalism is the view that the communicative content of the consti-
tutional text is determined by the original intentions of the framers.
Although phrases like “legislative intent” and “the original intentions of the
framers” are commonplace, it is not always clear what precisely is meant by
“intent” and “intention.”80  This is because the word intention is itself ambig-
uous (or general but used in more specific ways).  The relevant intentions
might be “communicative intentions”—the mental state that specifies the
communicative content the author meant to convey through the text.  Or the
relevant intentions might be purposes—the legal effects that the author
intended to produce in the case of legal writings.
Let us assume that the relevant intentions are communicative.  Thus, the
intent of a constitutional provision is a mental state that specifies the commu-
nicative content which the framers of that provision intended to convey
through the provision.  One way of understanding this content is the model
of speaker’s meaning suggested by Paul Grice.81  Let us adopt the following
simplified version:
80 The idea of “original intention” has been articulated in various ways.  Richard Kay
writes, “I mean by that term the meaning that textual language had for the relevant enac-
tors when they approved the text in question.”  Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public
Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 709 (2009) (footnote omit-
ted).  Raoul Berger suggests that “original intention” is “the sense in which the Constitu-
tion was accepted and ratified by the Nation.” BERGER, supra note 8, at 403 (quoting 9
JAMES MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 191 (G. Hunt ed., 1910)).
81 See PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 3–143 (1989); see also Jeffrey Gold-
sworthy, Legislative Intentions, Legislative Supremacy, and Legal Positivism, 42 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 493, 510 n.57 (2005); B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic
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Speaker’s Meaning: The speaker’s meaning of an utterance is the meaning
that the speaker intends to convey to the audience on the basis of the audi-
ence’s recognition of the speaker’s communicative intentions.
For the purposes of giving an intentionalist account of the Fixation The-
sis, nothing much hangs on the particular version of “original intent” that we
use.  Thus, one could also think of the relevant intentions as mental states
that are encoded in linguistic representations.  Or the mental states might be
expectations about the applications of the text or about the content of the
legal rules that the framers wanted the text to produce.
Whatever our account of original intentions, it is clear that they are fixed
at the time the text is framed or ratified.  So long as the relevant mental states
are those of particular persons who either authored the constitutional text or
made it legally effective by participating in its ratification, the content of the
mental states is fixed at a particular point in time—the time of framing or
ratification.  For the intentionalist, the Fixation Thesis is obviously true—
since communicative content is fixed by time-bound intentional mental
states.
2. Fixation and the Original Public Meaning of the Constitutional Text
As we have already observed, new originalism has embraced public
meaning originalism—the view that the original meaning of the constitu-
tional text is its public meaning.  For public meaning originalism, the com-
municative content of the constitutional text is fixed at the time the text of
each provision was communicated to the public.  In the case of the original
Constitution, that would be the period during which the work of the Phila-
delphia Convention was made public and the process of ratification began.82
The public meaning of the constitutional text is a function of the mecha-
nisms by which communicative content can be conveyed given the circum-
stances of constitutional communication.  These mechanisms are familiar
from the account of the Generalized Fixation Thesis offered above: public
meaning is conveyed by conventional semantic meanings and context.  Once
the mechanisms are understood, it becomes apparent that the public mean-
ing of the text is fixed at the time of public promulgation.
a. Semantic Content Is Fixed by Public Linguistic Facts at the Time
of Framing and Ratification
Each provision of the Constitution was promulgated to the public at a
particular time.  For ease of discussion, we can focus on the Constitution as it
was proposed in 1787.  The text was drafted in the Philadelphia Convention,
which met in nonpublic sessions.  The wording of the particular provisions of
the Constitution was the result of a complex process, including the work of
Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491, 506 n.80 (2005); John F. Manning,
What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 72 n.7 (2006).
82 For an account of the history, see PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE
THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788 (2010).
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the Committee on Detail and the Committee on Style.83  The communicative
situation of the framers was structured in a particular way.  At the macro
level, drafting was done by the convention as an institution.  At the micro
level, the particular words and phrases were contributed by different individ-
uals at different times with substantial work done by the Committee on Detail
and the final drafting done by the Committee on Style.  The convention met
in secret and neither the records of its deliberation nor the unrecorded
deliberations of the Committee on Style were made public during the ratifi-
cation period.
The public meaning of the text that was proposed in 1787 was necessa-
rily determined in large part by the conventional semantic meanings of the
words and phrases that make up the text and the regularities of usage that
are sometimes summarized as rules of grammar and syntax.  Conventional
semantic meanings and syntax are determined by linguistic facts—that is, by
regularities in usage.  And the relevant linguistic facts are those that formed
the basis for public understanding of the document, from the promulgation
of the text in 1787 and throughout the process of ratification.  These facts
partially fixed the original public meaning of the text.
b. Contextual Enrichment Is Fixed by the Public Context of Framing
and Ratification
From the perspective of public meaning originalism, facts about patterns
of usage do much of the work of determining the communicative content of
the constitutional text—but not all.  Additional work is done by the public
context of constitutional communication—the facts about the context of
constitutional communication that were accessible to the members of the
general public at the time the constitutional text was made public and subse-
quently ratified.  That is, the original public meaning was, in part, deter-
mined by the public context of constitutional communication.  Thus, the
public at large would have been aware of (or had access to) the basic history
of the Constitution.
The public context of constitutional communication is time-bound.  The
public would have had access to a variety of facts about context in the period
leading up to ratification, but could not have had access to facts about the
future.  Thus, the communicative content of the Constitution of 1789 could
not have been produced by public knowledge of the Civil War, the Great
Depression, or World War II—these events hadn’t happened yet and could
not have shaped public understanding in 1787.  What facts would form the
publicly available context of constitutional communication?  The set of facts
can only be established by evidence, but it seems likely that the public would
have had access to facts about the American Revolution, experience under
the Articles of Confederation, and the general shape of the common law
83 See Robert N. Clinton, A Brief History of the Adoption of the United States Constitution, 75
IOWA L. REV. 891 (1990); John R. Vile, The Critical Role of Committees at the U.S. Constitutional
Convention of 1787, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 147 (2006).
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legal regime in effect throughout the United States (and perhaps awareness
of regional variations within that regime).  Whatever the precise content of
the publicly available context, it was time-bound—consisting of events to
which the public had access in 1787.
3. Fixation in Other Versions of Originalism
Similar observations can be made about other versions of originalism.
For example, originalists who focus on the original understanding of the
ratifiers will view original meaning as fixed no later than the end of the ratifi-
cation process.  The gist of this form of originalism is that the relevant com-
municative content is the content that was understood by the participants in
the ratification process.  The original understandings of the ratifiers are time-
bound—the relevant period is bounded by the start and finish of the ratifica-
tion process—roughly from September 20, 1787,84 through May 29, 1790.85
Similar dates operate with respect to the various amendments.
Original methods originalists will believe that original meaning is fixed
by the methods of legal interpretation that existed at the time the Constitu-
tion was framed and ratified—and not later.  John McGinnis and Michael
Rappaport, the primary defenders of original methods originalism, imply the
time-boundedness of original methods in the following passage:
Ultimately, the legal interpretive rules that applied to the United States
Constitution are those that people at the time would have regarded as apply-
ing to a document like the Constitution.  Examining the particular interpre-
tive rules that early interpreters of the Constitution actually applied provides
some evidence of these rules.  Other evidence turns on which existing legal
documents the enactors thought were most like the federal Constitution.
The enactors would have been likely to apply the interpretive rules that were
regularly applied to documents like the Constitution.86
Thus, for original methods originalism, meaning is fixed at the time expecta-
tions regarding the legal interpretative rules are established, roughly the
period of framing and ratification.87
D. Summarizing the Affirmative Case for the Fixation Thesis
The core of the affirmative case for the Fixation Thesis is rooted in com-
monsense intuitions about the meaning of old texts of all kinds.  When we
84 September 20, 1787, is the date upon which the text was made public. Teaching with
Documents: The Ratification of the Constitution, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/
education/lessons/constitution-day/ratification.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2015).
85 May 29, 1790, is the date upon which the final state, Rhode Island, ratified. Id.
86 John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New The-
ory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 769 (2009).
87 For this reason, I believe that Stephen Sachs’s claim that the Fixation Thesis does
not mark an essential component of originalism is not precise.  Sachs, supra note 28, at
880–81.  Original-methods originalism assumes fixation but claims that it is the original
methods and not the original communicative content that is fixed.
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encounter an older text, we run into two interpretative problems.  First, the
language may be unfamiliar or familiar words may seem to be used in unfa-
miliar ways.  When we read a contemporary text, we rely on our knowledge of
conventional semantic meanings and contemporary syntax.  When we read
an old text, we may need to access the semantic and syntactic conventions of
the time when the text was written.  Second, the text may be ambiguous
because we lack knowledge of the context in which the text was written.  This
same problem can occur with a contemporary text, or not.  When we read an
old text, we may need to learn about the context in which the text was pro-
duced—this will enable us to “read between the lines” and resolve
ambiguities.
These commonsense principles apply to legal texts in general and the
Constitution in particular.  If we want to glean the communicative content of
the Constitution of 1789, we may need to know something about the way
words were used then and about the circumstances in which the Constitution
was produced.  Similarly, if we want to discern the meaning of the Recon-
struction Amendments, we will need to look to mid-nineteenth-century lin-
guistic practice and the context in which the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments were framed and ratified.
Originalism is a family of constitutional theories; prominent members of
that family include public meaning originalism, intentionalism, and original
methods originalism.  Despite their differences, all the members of the
originalist family agree on the Fixation Thesis, and all of them agree that
fixation occurs during the period when a provision is framed and ratified—
although the precise point during that period may be a matter of dispute.  As
a practical matter, this means that the commonsense case for the Fixation
Thesis can be affirmed in broad outline by all or almost all contemporary
originalists.
III. CLARIFICATIONS AND OBJECTIONS
Having made the affirmative case for the Fixation Thesis, we need to get
into the weeds, root out the confusions about fixation, and take a whack at
the objections.  In broad outline, the thrust of the discussion that follows is
that the Fixation Thesis should not be controversial.  Once the confusions
are cleared away, we will see that fixation is consistent with most plausible
views about constitutional meaning.88  Most of the actual controversy is not
about fixation, per se, but about two related issues.  First, some of the theo-
88 It should be noted that living constitutionalists and nonoriginalists do not bear uni-
lateral responsibility for the failure to engage the Fixation Thesis.  Originalists themselves
only began to embrace the interpretation-construction distinction in the late 1990s—and
that process is still underway: without a distinction between communicative content and
legal content, claims about fixation could not be formulated clearly.  The Fixation Thesis
was explicitly formulated as a claim about linguistic meaning (communicative content)
even more recently.  My first systematic exposition was in Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic
Originalism (Illinois Public Law Research Paper, No. 07-24, 2008 (Nov. 22, 2008)), http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1120244.
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rists who appear to be resisting the Fixation Thesis are actually contesting the
Constraint Principle: their real point is that legal content (e.g., constitutional
doctrine) is not fixed by original meaning.  Second, much of the remaining
controversy is not about the question whether the communicative content of
the constitutional text is fixed, but is rather focused on the question whether
(or more precisely, to what extent) the fixed content is determinate or
underdeterminate.89  In other words, the real point in controversy, at least
with respect to some constitutional provisions, is whether the original mean-
ing of the text is vague, open-textured, or irreducibly ambiguous.
These real controversies are important, but they are not the subjects of
this Article.  In this Article, I am not providing the arguments for the Con-
straint Principle—that is a topic for another day.  In this Article, I am not
providing originalist interpretations of the provisions of the Constitution that
some believe are especially open-ended.  That work can only be completed by
many originalist scholars over an extended period of time.  This Article is
about the Fixation Thesis, and if it makes a powerful case that the Fixation
Thesis is true, the Article will have achieved its objective.
One more preliminary comment: explicit objections to the Fixation The-
sis are rare.90  There are many reasons for the paucity of explicit objections.
89 For discussion of debates about indeterminacy, see Solum, supra note 43.
90 Three objections are considered in detail below. See infra Section III.B.  Another
explicit objection is found in Geoffrey Schotter, Note, Diachronic Constitutionalism: A Remedy
for the Court’s Originalist Fixation, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1241 (2010).  Full consideration of
Schotter’s arguments is outside the scope of this Article.  In brief, Schotter seems to have
conflated interpretation and construction and confused the content of the Fixation Thesis
(which addresses linguistic meaning) and the Constraint Principle (which addresses legal
practice).
Another explicit objection is articulated by Saul Cornell in the following passage:
Grice’s method has a number of important consequences for understanding
the historical meaning of the Constitution and other Founding-era legal texts.
Most originalists have assumed that constitutional communication involves a pro-
cess of fixation that is largely anchored by the semantic content of the Constitu-
tion’s text.  Marmor’s neo-Gricean framework suggests that meaning may not be
fixed by the semantic content of the Constitution’s text.  To achieve consensus at
the moment a text is enacted, the parties involved might agree on a common
language but not on a common meaning.  By compromising on language that
underdetermines constitutional meaning, legal actors can leave the resolution of
what a text means to subsequent actors to sort out through politics or judicial
determination.  If Marmor is correct, there may well be no original constitutional
meaning to discover for many of the more open-ended provisions of the Constitu-
tion.  Instead of establishing a fixed original meaning, the text of the Constitution
may do no more than set some minimal constraints on a range of possible consti-
tutional meanings to be determined by pragmatic features of the original consti-
tutional conversation.  If this is true, then the fixation thesis, central to so much
of originalism, may rest on a philosophical error.  The process of fixation of con-
stitutional meaning would not be semantically encoded at a Founding moment,
but would be resolved by pragmatic processes.
Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas: The Intellectual
History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 732 (2013).  Cornell’s objection
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First and perhaps foremost, much of the discourse in contemporary constitu-
tional theory is conducted without the benefit of the interpretation-construc-
tion distinction.  The phrase “constitutional interpretation” is used to refer to
both the discovery of communicative content and the determination of legal
effect.  The phrase “constitutional meaning” is used to refer to both linguistic
meaning and legal effect.  Given this conflation of meaning and effect, the
Fixation Thesis and the Constraint Principle become indistinguishable and
objections to the latter are easily mistaken as objections to the former.  Clari-
fying this confusion will be our first order of business.
A. Clarifying the Fixation Thesis
Recall the “official statement” of the Fixation Thesis:
The Fixation Thesis: The object of constitutional interpretation is the com-
municative content of the constitutional text, and that content was fixed
when each provision was framed and/or ratified.
Although this formulation is precise, debates about originalism since the
early 1980s have largely proceeded on the basis of looser (and more ambigu-
ous) formulations of the idea that the meaning of constitutional text is fixed.
The first step toward answering objections to the Fixation Thesis is to articu-
late the ways in which clarification of the content of the thesis disarms many
of the objections to the notion of fixed original meaning.
1. Fixation of Communicative Content, Not Legal Content
The Fixation Thesis is a claim about communicative content—meaning
in the communicative sense, or roughly, linguistic meaning.  It is not a claim
about legal content.  The communicative content of the constitutional text is
fixed at the time each provision is framed and ratified, but this does not
entail that the legal content of constitutional doctrine is fixed as well.  The
Fixation Thesis is a thesis about constitutional interpretation; it is not a claim
about constitutional construction.
conflates two distinct points—neither of which is inconsistent with the Fixation Thesis as
formulated here.  The first objection is based on the idea that the constitutional text may
be underdeterminate: as already noted, many new originalists explicitly endorse this idea
when they embrace the Fact of Constitutional Underdeterminacy and embrace the exis-
tence of construction zones. See supra Section I.C and text accompanying note 49. R
Underdeterminacy and fixation are conceptually distinct. See infra subsection III.A.3
(explaining the distinction between underdeterminacy in application and fixation of com-
municative content).  The second objection is based on the unexplained and undefended
assertion that the contribution of context to communicative content (“pragmatics” or
“pragmatic enrichment”) is for some reason inconsistent with the fixation of meaning.  In
fact, the opposite is true, because context is time-bound, the contribution of context to
meaning is the second general reason that the Fixation Thesis is true. See supra subsection
II.C.2.b.  To the extent that Cornell’s point is that semantic content is sparse and hence
that discovery of the full communicative content of a writing requires consideration of
contextual enrichment, he is correct and I am in full agreement.  But this point is in no
way inconsistent with the Fixation Thesis.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-1\NDL101.txt unknown Seq: 33  8-DEC-15 12:32
2015] the  fixation  thesis 33
* * *
Perhaps at this stage in the exposition, readers may have grown weary of the
repetition of this point.  “Fixation of communicative content—I get it already.”  But we
are now ready to draw on the implications of this clarification for points that are
frequently made in discussions about originalism.  The critics of originalism frequently
argue that legal content changes and draw the conclusion that “meaning” is not fixed.
That is all well and good if what you mean by “meaning” is “doctrine.”  Originalists
argue that doctrine should be constrained by the fixed communicative content of the
constitutional text—and most emphatically not that as a matter of fact the content of
constitutional doctrine has been fixed.  Indeed, many originalists complain loudly
about some changes in constitutional doctrine on the ground that these changes involve
a departure from original meaning.
* * *
Consider the oft-made observation that originalism does not account for
the obvious need to adapt the Constitution to changing circumstances.  We
will also consider a related objection that uses the metaphor of a “dead
hand.”91  If the original meaning of the text is fixed, how can we apply the
freedom of speech to the Internet or the Fourth Amendment to overflight of
private homes by drones with infrared sensors?  Let us call this point the
“Novel Applications Objection.”  The assumption of the Novel Applications
Objection is that fixed meaning entails fixed legal effect.  If the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment is fixed, then so too must be the content of Fourth
Amendment doctrine and the set of situations to which the Fourth Amend-
ment does (and does not) apply.
But the assumption that fixed communicative content entails static doc-
trines and a frozen set of applications is false—for two reasons.
First, the argument that fixation of linguistic meaning entails fixed legal
effect is conceptually confused.  Communicative content is simply the mean-
ing of the text: you need more than meaning to get legal effect.  Compare
the meaning of the Constitution of the Confederate States of America to the
legal effect of that document, if you have any doubt on this score.  For the
Fixation Thesis to have any logical implications for legal practice, it must be
combined with some other premise (like the Constraint Principle).
Second, to the extent that the Fixation Thesis does have implications for
constitutional practice when it is combined with the Constraint Principle, this
does not imply that either doctrine or applications are frozen.  This point
can be illustrated by considering the case of non-legal commands generally.
Suppose that a college dormitory adopts a regulation that prohibits residents
from placing their own furniture in the common areas: “No resident may
position furniture in common areas, except temporarily for the purpose of
moving the furniture either in or out of the resident’s own room.”  At the
91 See generally Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation,
108 COLUM. L. REV. 606 (2008).
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time the regulation was written, there were tables, chairs, and many other
types of furniture, but no “bean bags” or “futons.”  New types of furniture are
invented from time to time—presumably, love seats and chaise lounges have
not existed since pre-historic times.  The semantic content of the term “furni-
ture” can be fixed, even though new kinds of furniture are invented.  This
commonsense point about general terms in ordinary language use extends to
the Constitution: even if the semantic content of “search” is fixed, that does
not entail that there cannot be novel methods by which searches are
conducted.92
To be clear, our analysis of the Novel Applications Objection does not
answer a related objection—that the communicative content of the text may
need to be changed to keep up with the times.  Let us call this objection the
“Dead Hand Objection.”93  Imagine that the world changes in a way that ren-
ders some provision of the Constitution obsolete.  The Constitution assumes
that there is a plentiful supply of humans over the age of thirty-five—the
constitutional minimum for becoming president.  What if that were to
change because of a disease that killed everyone over the age of thirty?  Obvi-
ously, we would amend the Constitution if we could, but what if we couldn’t?
(The plague has disrupted so many state legislatures that it is simply not pos-
sible to enact an amendment for a two- or three-year period, and we need a
President now.)  This is a case where the dead hand of fixed communicative
content would prevent us from doing something we need to do.  This would
be a reason to suspend or disregard the Constitution (to act contrary to the
Constraint Principle), but it is not an objection to the Fixation Thesis.94
Indeed, the Dead Hand Objection assumes that the Fixation Thesis is true! The
Dead Hand Objection is a challenge to the Constraint Principle—and that
topic is simply outside the scope of this Article.
The thrust of this subsection of the Article is that the Fixation Thesis is a
claim about communicative content and not legal content.  But that claim
could itself be contested.  It might be argued that there is no such distinc-
tion.  That is, one might argue that the communicative content of legal texts
reduces to their legal effect.  I have explored this objection in considerable
depth elsewhere.95
The basic idea is that legal texts have no communicative content other
than the legal content they produce.  One way of expressing this objection
92 Notice that this answer to the Novel Applications Objection is ecumenical: it can be
embraced by new originalists who accept the existence of construction zones and by
originalists who believe that the communicative content of the constitutional text is thick
enough to provide determinate (or nearly determinate) constitutional doctrine.
93 See generally Samaha, supra note 91.
94 To be clear, I am not taking a position on the Dead Hand Objection here.  My own
view is that the Constraint Principle is subject to limited defeasibility conditions triggered
by extraordinary circumstances, but their elaboration is well beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. See generally THE LOGIC OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS: ESSAYS ON DEFEASIBILITY (Jordi Ferrer
Beltra´n & Giovanni Battista Ratti eds., 2012) (collecting essays that discuss the idea of
defeasibility in law).
95 See Solum, supra note 1, at 486, 494, 509.
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draws on Justice Holmes’s idea of the bad man.  The bad man doesn’t care
about the “meaning” of legal texts; he cares about what the law will do to
him.96  Suppose that were true: the fact that bad men don’t care about com-
municative content does not establish that it doesn’t exist.  In fact, this way of
putting things assumes that there is a linguistic meaning that bad men
ignore.  The same point could be made about the realist distinction between
the law on the books and the law in action.97  The law in action may be what
most care about, but that doesn’t mean that there is no such thing as the law
in the books.
There is another reason to resist the attempt to reduce communicative
content to legal content.  Some of the ways that we talk about law only make
sense if there is a real distinction between communicative content and legal
content.  For example, contract law has mandatory rules; these rules override
the communicative content of the contract itself.  The whole point of
mandatory rules is to override the communicative content of the contract,
but that notion would make no sense if there were no communicative con-
tent to override.  Similarly, default rules supply legal content that was not
supplied by the contract itself.  Again, the idea of default rule only makes
sense if there is communicative content with gaps.98
For these and other reasons, it is simply not the case that communicative
content collapses into legal content—and likewise the meaning of the consti-
tutional text is not the same thing as the set of effects that the text produces.
The Fixation Thesis is a claim about communicative content—not legal con-
tent or legal effect.
2. Fixation of Expression-Token Meaning, Not Expression-Type Meaning
* * *
Upon reading the title of this subsection, I imagine some readers will be silently
mouthing “uh oh,” “huh?,” or “what does that mean?”  Phrases like “expression-token
meaning” reek of terminological obfuscation or pretention, plus they sound a bit boring
or even intimidating.
So you might be tempted to skip this section.  But please don’t!  Bear with me.  I
promise that I will explain the type-token distinction and that it will do valuable work
in clarifying the Fixation Thesis and dissolving a certain kind of objection to the idea
that constitutional meaning is fixed.
96 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
97 Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 22–23 (1910).
98 There is a large literature on default and mandatory rules in contract law. See, e.g.,
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Con-
tractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992); Lawrence B. Solum, The Boundaries of Legal
Discourse and the Debate over Default Rules in Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 311
(1993); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitra-
tion, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703 (1999).
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* * *
Here is the gist of what follows.  Originalism is a thesis about the mean-
ing of the text of the Constitution of the United States that was adopted by
the Philadelphia Convention—the text as it was written in ink on sheets of
parchment at a particular place and time.  There is a manuscript version of
the Constitution that was produced at the Philadelphia Convention and
signed by the framers: that manuscript is a token of the constitutional text.
(There are similar manuscript versions of each of the amendments.)  The
words and phrases that were used in the canonical version of the text could
have different meanings if they were uttered at a different time and place:
the semantic content of the phrase “freedom of speech” in a constitution
written for South Africa in 1996 could be different than the same words as
they appear in the original version of the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution—the version produced by the First Congress.99
Just as individual phrases and clauses from the United States Constitu-
tion can be reused on other occasions, the whole string of words that consti-
tute the constitutional text can be uttered on new occasions.  Imagine an
author using the actual text of our Constitution in an alternative history
novel.  We can imagine a possible world in which the words of the Constitu-
tion had different meanings and the context in which the words were written
was radically different.  In such worlds, the Constitution would have a differ-
ent meaning, even though the type (the pattern constituted by the string of
letters, punctuation marks, and spaces) would be identical.  The Fixation
Thesis does not claim that the Constitution as an expression type has a fixed
meaning.  That claim would simply be false—because the expression type
can and does have meanings that change with circumstances of utterance.
The Fixation Thesis applies to the Constitution as an expression token
promulgated at a particular time and place; it is not a claim about the consti-
tutional text as an expression type that could be uttered in a vast variety of
circumstances.
a. The Type-Token Distinction
Let’s begin with the type-token distinction itself.100  Tokens are particu-
lar individuals.  So the particular MacBook Air upon which I wrote most of
this Article is a token notebook computer.  Types are collections of particu-
lars.  The phrase “MacBook Air” can also be used to refer to a model (or
related series of models) of personal computers manufactured by Apple.
The device that I used to type this Article is a token, Lawrence Solum’s
MacBook Air, of a type, the MacBook Air model line manufactured by Apple.
99 The actual Constitution of South Africa does contain a free speech clause.  It pro-
tects the “freedom of expression, which includes . . . freedom of the press” and “academic
freedom.” S. AFR. CONST., 1996.  Explicitly excluded are “propaganda for war,” “incite-
ment of imminent violence,” and hate speech. Id.
100 For a succinct introduction, see Linda Wetzel, Types and Tokens, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHIL. (Apr. 28, 2006), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/types-tokens/.
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The concrete particular is a token; the general and abstract sort to which the
concrete particulars belong is a type.  That is the type-token distinction.
Now consider the application of the type-token distinction to expres-
sions, written or oral.  Consider the expression, “This MacBook Air belongs
to Lawrence Solum.”  Suppose that I utter that expression at a particular
place and time—on August 24, 2013, in the Kogod Courtyard of the Smithso-
nian Museum of American Art in Washington, D.C.  (In fact, as I was writing
an earlier version of this Article, I did exactly that!)  This utterance is an
expression token—a particular instance of a string of sounds.  But the very
same words could be used over and over again.  I could point to my neigh-
bor’s MacBook Air, and say, “This MacBook Air belongs to Lawrence Solum.”
On this second occasion, the statement would have been false.  The second
occasion involves a different token of the expression, but the new utterance
is an expression of the same type.  All token expressions of the form, “This
MacBook Air belongs to Lawrence Solum,” belong to that type.
Next, consider the application of the type-token distinction to legal
expressions.  Take a provision of the Model Penal Code.  The Model Penal
Code itself is not a statute—it is a model for statutes.  A Model Penal Code
provision might be enacted by several different states.  Each state’s version of
the provision, as enacted by the legislature and signed into law at a particular
time and place, is an expression token.  And at the same time, all the state
statutes with the identical wording are members of an expression type.
It is possible that all of the different enactments of a single Model Penal
Code provision have identical communicative content, but it is actually quite
likely that this is not the case.  For example, when the Model Penal Code
defines “statute,” it includes “a local law or ordinance of a political subdivi-
sion of the State.”101  The official Alabama token102 of the Model Penal Code
means “of Alabama” when it uses this definition, but the official Mississippi
token refers to Mississippi—even though the wording (the expression type)
is the same.
* * *
That is the type-token distinction.  I am using philosophical jargon to express the
distinction.  But the distinction itself is very simple and intuitive—we use and recog-
nize the distinction all the time, even if we don’t know the technical vocabulary.  We all
know the difference between a general sort of thing (type) and its particular concrete
instances (tokens).
If you are still having trouble, try this example: Gertrude Stein wrote, “Rose is a
rose is a rose is a rose.”  How many words were there in Stein’s famous line?  Three—if
we are counting word types (“rose,” “is,” and “a”).  Ten—if we are talking about word
tokens: four tokens of “rose,” three of “is,” and three of “a.”
101 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13 (“General Definitions.  In this Code, unless a different
meaning plainly is required: (1) ‘statute’ includes the Constitution and a local law or ordi-
nance of a political subdivision of the State . . . .”).
102 The copy signed by the governor might be the official token.
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* * *
b. Fixation of Communicative Content of the Official Token
Constitutional Text, Not the Type
The Generalized Fixation Thesis is a claim about expression tokens.
When we say that the communicative content of an expression is fixed at the
time of utterance—the saying or writing at a particular place and time, our
claim is that the meaning of the expression token is fixed.  The very same
words in the same order could have different communicative content if
uttered on a different occasion.  This is obviously true in the case of expres-
sions that include indexicals, words like “here,” “now,” “I,” and “you.”  If I
walk into the restaurant at the Chateau Marmont and say, “Here I am,” it
means that Lawrence Solum is at the restaurant at the Chateau Marmont.  If
Lindsay Lohan walks into the Bar Marmont, located down the street and says,
“Here I am,” she means that Lindsay Lohan is at the Bar Marmont.  Same
expression type, different expression token, different meanings.  Each token
expression has a fixed meaning, but the meaning of the expression type is
not fixed in this way.  And for that reason, the meanings of different expres-
sion tokens of the same type need not be identical.103
The Fixation Thesis is a claim about the meaning of a collection of
expression tokens.  The first element of the collection is the Constitution of
1789—the text that was framed in 1787 at the Philadelphia Convention.  To
that first element, we have added various amendments.  The text of each
amendment is itself an expression token—drafted at a particular time and
place.  The collection gathers together the expression tokens.  We call this
collection, the “Constitution of the United States.”
* * *
Are you with me?  The token meaning of the authoritative version of each part of
the constitutional text is fixed.  The next step is to consider the meaning of expression
types.
* * *
Fragments of the Constitution of the United States are also expression
types.  For example, “freedom of speech,” “due process of law,” and “judicial
power” are expression types.  These phrases are used over and over again—in
judicial opinions, legal scholarship, and ordinary talk.  Each particular use is
an expression token, and the meanings of these tokens are not necessarily
identical to the original meaning of the corresponding and identical text in
the official token part of the Constitution of the United States.
103 The claim is that the meaning of different expression tokens need not be identical,
but not that they cannot be identical.
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The United States Supreme Court frequently quotes the text of the Con-
stitution.104  Originalists believe that when the Supreme Court uses the lan-
guage of the Constitution, it should give that language its original meaning—
the meaning that the text had in the original expression token.  But you
cannot make the Supreme Court do this.  For one thing, the Supreme Court
can misunderstand the Constitution and assign a meaning to a constitutional
word or phrase that differs from its original meaning.  And even if the
Supreme Court understands the original meaning, it could decide to deliber-
ately introduce a new meaning—and that new meaning would bind lower
courts and officials, because the Supreme Court is, well, supreme!  Moreover,
the meaning given by the Court to constitutional language could then influ-
ence other language users.  Misunderstandings or deliberate distortions
introduced by the Supreme Court could affect the way contemporary speak-
ers and authors use constitutional language.  For this reason, the Fixation
Thesis does not apply to the Constitution as an expression type.
Let us restate the main points:
• The Fixation Thesis applies to the constitutional text as an expres-
sion token—the official version of the Constitution of 1789 and of
each amendment as ratified.
• The Fixation Thesis does not claim that subsequent token uses of the
constitutional text have a meaning that is identical to the fixed mean-
ing of the original token.
• Courts, scholars, and citizens can and do use fragments of the consti-
tutional text to convey communicative content that differs from the
original meaning.
• The Constraint Principle expresses the claim that judges and officials
should not substitute new meanings for the constitutional text when
they give the Constitution legal effect, but “should” does not imply
“will” or “must.”
c. The Type-Meaning Fallacy
At this point, we have laid out the type-token distinction and related that
distinction to the Fixation Thesis.  We are now in a position to understand
how a certain kind of argument against the Fixation Thesis is based on a
mistake, in particular, a confusion between types and tokens.  We can call
this mistake the “Type-Meaning Fallacy.”
Let’s approach the fallacy in stages.  We can begin with an argument
based on a very simple thought experiment.  Here is a statement of the
argument:
We can imagine that the United States Constitution or parts of it were writ-
ten today for the first time.  If the Constitution were written today, it would
not have the same meaning as does the actual Constitution, written at vari-
104 Supreme Court opinions are themselves both tokens and types.  There is an official
token version of each Supreme Court opinion, which is then copied and quoted—other
tokens of the same type.
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ous times starting in 1787.  From this fact, it follows that meanings can
change over time, and therefore the Fixation Thesis is false.
Perhaps this argument is not even superficially appealing.  It is clearly
based on a fallacy.  The meaning of the constitutional text token written in
1787 does not change in the hypothetical; it is a new token of the same type
of text that has a different meaning.  But the Fixation Thesis does not claim
that different tokens of the same type cannot have different meanings.  So
the thought experiment does not show that the Fixation Thesis is false.
Here is a slightly different and more sophisticated version of the argu-
ment of the thought experiment.  Let’s call this version the “Contemporary
Meaning Argument.”  The argument proceeds as follows:
When we use constitutional language today, we understand the meaning of
that language as it is used today.  Contemporary usage is influenced by
Supreme Court opinions and popular beliefs about the meaning of phrases
like “freedom of speech,” “equal protection,” and “unreasonable search.”
The contemporary conventional semantic meanings of the words and
phrases that make up the constitutional text system change over time.
Therefore, the communicative content of the constitutional text is not fixed.
Moreover, we have good reason to give these contemporary meanings legal
authority.  It is this contemporary meaning that is endorsed by “We the Peo-
ple” today, and popular sovereignty vests in the contemporary polity—not
the dead hands of “They the People of 1787” or “They the People of 1865.”
Therefore, the Fixation Thesis is false.  The meaning of the Constitution of
the United States changes to reflect the changing beliefs, values, and linguis-
tic practices of the American People.
The Contemporary Meaning Argument may seem appealing (or not),
but it does not refute the Fixation Thesis.  That thesis is about expression
tokens, not expression types.  To the extent that the argument based on
evolving linguistic practice is presented as a refutation of the Fixation Thesis,
it commits the Type-Meaning Fallacy.
The Contemporary Meaning Argument can be reformulated so as to
avoid the fallacy.  The reformulation can begin by conceding that the Fixa-
tion Thesis is true.  The reformulated version then switches its target to the
Constraint Principle.  The argument then becomes that the original meaning
should not constrain contemporary practice and that constitutional changes
are legitimate so long as they are reflected in the contemporary meaning of
the corresponding constitutional text tokens—that is, contemporary uses of
the phrases that also appear in the original version.  A fully specified version
of this theory of legitimate constitutional change will need to provide an
account of what makes these changes legitimate.  Presumably, the argument
for legitimacy based on contemporary meaning will not be that the Supreme
Court can make any change it wants—so long as the change succeeds in alter-
ing linguistic practices so that the conventional understanding of the consti-
tutional text is altered.
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The revised version of the Contemporary Meaning Argument would run
into severe difficulties: those problems will be explored in depth below.105
For now, the important point is that the plausibility of the revised version of
the Contemporary Meaning Argument is actually beside the point so far as
this Article is concerned, because the revised version of the argument leaves
the Fixation Thesis untouched.  The revised Contemporary Meaning Argu-
ment does not claim that the meaning of the original token is not fixed; it
does claim that the communicative content of the original Constitution
should not constrain contemporary constitutional practice—in other words,
the argument is directed at the Constraint Principle.
3. Fixation of Meaning, Not Determinacy of Meaning
Legal texts can be more or less determinate in application.  This truism
can be expressed in a variety of ways.  One helpful distinction is between
“determinacy,” “indeterminacy,” and “underdeterminacy.”106  We can say
that a legal text is fully determinate with respect to a set of possible applica-
tions if the legal rule that corresponds to the text produces outcomes for all
the applications in the set.  We sometimes call such rules “bright-line rules,”
because they fully sort the cases to which they are applied.  We can say that a
legal text is completely indeterminate with respect to a set of possible applica-
tions if the rule corresponding to the text produces outcomes for none of the
applications of the set.  A rule of this kind would do no work at all—because
any outcome is consistent with the rule.  We can say that a legal text is
underdeterminate with respect to an application set if the rule correspond-
ing to the text produces outcomes for some but not all of the applications in
the set.  These are the rules captured by Hart’s picture of the core and
penumbra.107
The Fixation Thesis claims that communicative content is fixed, not that
it is fully determinate.  Indeed, the Fixation Thesis makes no claim about
determinacy at all: if the communicative content of the constitutional text
were radically indeterminate, that would be consistent with the Fixation The-
sis.  As we shall see, many of the objections that might seem to apply to the
Fixation Thesis are actually claims that the rules corresponding to particular
parts of the constitutional text are underdeterminate.  Arguments based on
the concept-conception distinction and open texture might seem to threaten
the Fixation Thesis, but on a closer look, they would show (if true) that the
constitutional text is relatively less determinate (or relatively more
underdeterminate) than it seems on first inspection.
Finally, there is one important qualification of this clarification of the
relationship between fixation and determinacy.  If it were the case that the
actual text of the Constitution was radically indeterminate, then, depending
on how you look at things, we might say that the Fixation Thesis was irrele-
105 See infra Section IV.A.
106 See Solum, supra note 43, at 473.
107 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 119–50 (Peter Cane et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994).
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vant.  For the purposes of this Article, we shall simply put that objection to
the side.108
* * *
We have now clarified the Fixation Thesis in three ways.  The claim is that com-
municative content (not legal content) is fixed.  Moreover, the Fixation Thesis is a
claim about particular tokens of the constitutional text.  And finally, the Fixation The-
sis is a claim about communicative content and not about determinacy of the legal rules
that correspond to that content.
These clarifications tell us what would count as a real objection to the Fixation
Thesis.  For an objection to clash directly with fixation, it must: (1) be directed at
communicative content (and not legal content), (2) be directed at the meaning of rele-
vant tokens (the concrete particular version that is the officially promulgated text) and
not contemporary tokens of the same type, and (3) be directed at fixation of meaning
and not at determinacy of meaning.
* * *
B. Answering Objections to the Fixation Thesis
We are now in a position to consider four objections to the Fixation
Thesis.  Each objection is based on a distinctive account of meaning.  The
first objection relies on the concept-conception distinction.  The second
objection is based on the idea that legal concepts have essential structures; in
its best form, the idea would be that the language of the Constitution refers
to functional kinds that are analogous to natural kinds.  The third objection
draws on Wittgensteinian ideas about meaning, including the idea of family
resemblance and the related notion of open texture.  The fourth objection
uses the idea of reader’s meaning, arguing that readers’ understandings of
the communicative content changes over time.
1. Concepts and Conceptions
Let’s begin with what I believe is the most common objection to the
Fixation Thesis—an objection that deploys the concept-conception distinc-
tion, introduced above.109  The argument is frequently made in the context
of discussions of the Eighth Amendment, which provides: “Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.”110
The objection zeroes in on the word “cruel” and paraphrases the
Amendment as a prohibition of cruel punishments.  The next move is to
108 For discussion of the indeterminacy thesis in general jurisprudence, see id. Heidi
Kitrosser argues that originalism is implicitly based on what she calls the “Determinism
Premise.”  Heidi Kitrosser, Interpretive Modesty, 104 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2015–16), http:/
/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2463366.
109 See supra text accompanying note 67.
110 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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invoke the concept-conception distinction.  The objection asserts that the
word “cruel” invokes the general concept of cruelty and not a particular con-
ception of cruelty.111  This point can then be applied to the Fixation Thesis:
the meaning of cruel is not fixed, the objection maintains, because our con-
ception of cruelty changes over time.  This point can then be generalized to
other provisions of the Constitution: “equal protection,” “due process,” “free-
dom of speech,” and so forth.  Let us call the generalized objection, the
“Concept-Conception Argument.”
a. Understanding the Concept-Conception Argument
Before we formulate an answer to the objection, we need to understand
it.  When the objection is made, the concept-conception distinction is rarely
developed in depth and this may lead to mistakes about what the objection
actually shows.  So far as I know, the concept-conception distinction
originates with Essentially Contested Concepts, a paper published by the philoso-
pher William Gallie in 1956.112  The core of Gallie’s argument was the idea
that certain moral concepts are “essentially contested.”  “Good,” “right,” and
“just,” for example, are each moral concepts that seem to have a common or
shared meaning.  That is, when I say that the alleviation of unnecessary suf-
fering is good, you understand what I mean.  But it may be that you and I
differ on the criteria for the application of the term “good.”  You may think
that a state of affairs is good to the extent that it produces pleasure or the
absence of pain, while I may think that the criteria for “good” make refer-
ence to the conception of a flourishing human life—a life of social and
rational activity lived in accord with the human excellences or virtues.  We
share the concept of “good,” but we have different conceptions of what con-
stitutes a good life.
Sometimes, when there is this sort of disagreement, we want to say, “Ah,
you and I are referring to different concepts.”  If by “cause,” you mean “legal
cause,” whereas I use “cause” as a synonym for “cause in fact,” then we are
using the same word to refer to two different concepts.  If this were the case,
then “cause” would be ambiguous and once the ambiguity had been identi-
fied, we would come to realize that we were talking past one another.
But in the case of “good,” we seem to be using the same concept.  I think
that the good really is human flourishing and not pleasure; you have the
opposite opinion.  So we are contesting the meaning of the concept “good,”
and each of us has a different conception of that concept.  We are not talking
past one another; we are disagreeing.  Gallie thought that some concepts
were essentially contested.  That is, Gallie believed that some concepts were
111 The Concept-Conception argument is strongly associated with Ronald Dworkin. See
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 103, 147 (rev. ed. 1997).  For invocations of
the argument, see Timothy P. O’Neill, Constitutional Argument as Jeremiad, 45 VAL. U. L.
REV. 33, 43 (2010).  For criticism, see Christopher R. Green, “This Constitution”: Constitu-
tional Indexicals as a Basis for Textualist Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1607,
1633–34 (2009).
112 Gallie, supra note 67, at 167.
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such that we would never reach agreement on the criteria for application of
the concepts.  If a concept is essentially contested, then it is in the nature of
the concept that we disagree about the criteria for its application.
Perhaps the most famous use of the concept-conception distinction is
found in the political philosopher John Rawls’s famous book, A Theory of Jus-
tice.113  Rawls appeals to the distinction between the concept of justice and
particular conceptions of justice.  His theory, justice as fairness, is defended
as the best conception of justice.  Notice that as used by Rawls, the concept-
conception distinction does not imply that the concept of justice is essentially
contested.  It might be the case that we would eventually come to agreement
on the criteria for a just society.  In other words, not all contested concepts
are essentially contested concepts.
b. Dworkinian Versions of the Concept-Conception Argument
This brings us back to the use of the concept-conception distinction
found in Ronald Dworkin’s theory, “law as integrity.”  You may know that
Dworkin uses a hypothetical judge, Hercules, to illustrate his theory.  Many
believe that Dworkin’s theory changed over time.114  The version of the the-
ory that I am employing in this subsection of the Article is that found in his
essay Hard Cases115 and in the other essays by Dworkin that are cited below.
Suppose that Hercules is interpreting the United States Constitution.
He finds that the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution makes refer-
ence to the concept of equality.  In order to decide some case, about affirma-
tive action, say, Hercules must decide what equality means.  To do this,
Hercules will determine what conception of equality best fits and justifies our
legal practices—narrowly, the Equal Protection Clause cases, but more
broadly, the whole of American constitutional law and indeed the entire
institutional history of the republic.  For Dworkin, “equality” is not an “essen-
tially contested concept,” because Dworkin does not take the position that
there cannot be stable criteria for the meaning of concepts like equality.
Rather, “equality” is an interpretive concept—a concept that is subject to
interpretation.  Interpretive concepts like equality are, in fact, contested, and
may, in fact, always be contested, but this is not an “essential” (necessary)
characteristic of interpretive concepts.
How does Dworkin’s use of the concept-conception distinction relate to
the communicative content of the constitutional text and in particular to the
Fixation Thesis?  The most natural interpretation is that concepts are ambig-
uous in a special way.  Conceptions of a concept correspond to senses of an
ambiguous word or phrase.  But there is a difference.  The senses of ambigu-
ous terms are identified by examining usage.  We learn that “cool” can refer
to temperature or style by observing the different senses in which “cool” is
113 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 5 (rev. ed. 1999).
114 Lawrence B. Solum, The Unity of Interpretation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 551, 553–558 (2010).
115 RONALD DWORKIN, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 111.  A more
elaborate version of the theory appears in RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 90 (1986).
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used in English.  Ambiguous words and phrases are not indeterminate,
because the different senses are fixed by usage—subject of course to the fact
that usage can change over time.116
In the case of Dworkin’s deployment of the concept-conception distinc-
tion, usage does not constrain in the same way for two reasons.  First, Dwor-
kin’s theory does not select among conceptions on the basis of context.
When we encounter an ambiguous word in a text, we ordinarily can discern
which sense of the ambiguous term is intended by considering the context.
Thus, in the sentence immediately preceding this one, “term” is used in a
sense that is roughly equivalent to “word” and not in the sense of “period or
duration” as in “term of office.”  But Dworkin chooses among conceptions on
the basis of moral argument: his theory requires that Hercules use the best
conception of cruelty, equality, or freedom of speech.
Second, in the case of ordinary ambiguity, the set of alternative mean-
ings is closed.  Membership in the set of alternative meanings is established
by usage.  Dworkin’s idea seems to admit the possibility that when Hercules
constructs the theory that best fits and justifies the law as a whole, he might
(in principle) discover that the conception implicated by that theory is newly
constructed and not sanctioned by current usage.  Even for Dworkin, usage
plays a role.  For a general concept to be meaningful (and not merely an
empty vessel into which any content whatsoever could be poured), the con-
cept must have content that limits what would count as a conception of that
concept.  So even for a Dworkinian, usage should fix the outer limits of the
concept, but not the list of eligible conceptions.
c. The Dworkinian Argument for the General Concept Interpretation
of General or Abstract Constitutional Language
We can illustrate the Dworkinian version of the Concept-Conception
Argument with respect to Dworkin’s own example—the Equal Protection
Clause.  At the stage of interpretation, the question would be whether the
conventional semantic meaning of “equal protection of the laws” is some-
thing like “treatment required by the general concept of equality.”  Call this
the “General Concept Interpretation.”  Dworkin assumes that the alternative
to the General Concept Interpretation is an interpretation based on beliefs
about the cruelty of particular punishments.  In recent constitutional theory,
these beliefs are sometimes called “original expected applications.”117  Let’s
call this rival of Dworkin’s interpretation the “Original Expected Applications
Interpretation.”
To answer the question whether the General Concept Interpretation (or
its rival) is correct, we would look to evidence of usage during the period
116 See STEINMETZ, supra note 61, at vii–xii.
117 Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
427, 444 (2007).  The idea (but not the phrase “original expected applications”) was intro-
duced earlier by Mark Greenberg and Harry Litman. See Mark D. Greenberg & Harry
Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569 (1998).
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when the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was
drafted and ratified.
From the perspective of originalism, the question is which of these two
competing interpretations provides the actual communicative content of the
Fourteenth Amendment.  What kind of evidence bears on this question?
One kind of evidence is based on armchair speculation about which interpre-
tation is more likely, given our knowledge of the communicative situation
and our general knowledge of the human situation: call this kind of evidence
“armchair speculation.”  Another kind of evidence is based on linguistic facts
(patterns of usage during the Reconstruction Era) and context (the circum-
stances in which the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted and ratified): call
this kind of evidence “historical facts.”
Dworkin relies on armchair speculation: he argues that the Framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment must have meant the general concept of equal-
ity and not any particular conception.  Dworkin provides no historical evi-
dence about linguistic practices or the context of ratification.  For example,
he has no historical evidence that shows that those involved in the framing
and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment implicitly recognized the con-
cept-conception distinction and intended to use the general concept of
equality in the Equal Protection Clause.  To show that Dworkin reasons in
this way, we need to examine an extended passage that reveals his method of
argument:
When we come to the word “cruel” in the Eighth Amendment, the
equal protection language of the Fourteenth, the freedom of speech lan-
guage of the First, and the due process language of the Fifth and the Four-
teenth, however, we have more difficult problems of translation.  We have to
choose between an abstract, principled, moral reading—the authors meant
to prohibit punishments that are in fact cruel as well as unusual or meant to
prohibit whatever discriminations are in fact inconsistent with equal citizen-
ship—and a concrete, dated reading—they meant to say that punishments
widely thought cruel as well as unusual at the time they spoke, or discrimina-
tions then generally understood to reflect unfair distinctions, are prohibited.
If the correct interpretation is the abstract one, then judges attempting to
keep faith with the text today must sometimes ask themselves whether pun-
ishments the Framers would not themselves have considered cruel—capital
punishment, for example—nevertheless are cruel, and whether discrimina-
tions the Framers themselves thought consistent with equal citizenship—
school segregation, for example—are nevertheless a denial of equal protec-
tion of the laws.  If the correct interpretation is the dated one, on the other
hand, these questions would be out of place, at least as part of an exercise in
textual fidelity, because the only questions a dated understanding would
pose is the question of what the Framers or their audience thought.
If we are trying to make best sense of the Framers speaking as they did
in the context in which they spoke, we should conclude that they intended
to lay down abstract not dated commands and prohibitions.  The Framers
were careful statesmen who knew how to use the language they spoke.  We
cannot make good sense of their behavior unless we assume that they meant
to say what people who use the words they used would normally mean to
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say—that they used abstract language because they intended to state abstract
principles.  They are best understood as making a constitution out of
abstract moral principles, not coded references to their own opinions (or
those of their contemporaries) about the best way to apply those
principles.118
In this passage, Dworkin relies on armchair speculation and not histori-
cal facts.  Let me be clear.  I do not mean to imply that armchair speculation
is irrelevant.  Done well, the method of armchair speculation can provide
evidence that is relevant and might even be decisive.  But when we are look-
ing for communicative content, the method of armchair speculation does
not provide direct evidence.  That evidence will be found in historical fact—
that is, evidence about how the relevant language was actually being used at
the time and evidence about the context in which the language was used.
At this point, we are almost ready to take Dworkin’s argument head on,
but before we do we need to clear up a problem in the argument as Dworkin
and others have stated it.  The problem is that Dworkin’s argument sup-
presses the real alternative to the General Concept Interpretation of words
like “cruel” and phrases like “equal protection of the laws.”  In other words,
Dworkin and others have committed the fallacy of the excluded middle.
d. The Excluded Middle Problem: Either Original Expected
Applications or Dworkinian Interpretivism
Jed Rubenfeld has argued that reconciliation of the concept-conception
distinction with originalism collapses originalism into Dworkin’s theory.
Here is his argument:
As soon as an originalist starts saying that the framers’ and ratifiers’ con-
crete historical understandings of a constitutional provision were “mistaken”
and may therefore be ignored in favor of the semantic or objective linguistic
meaning of the words at the time of enactment, he is no longer an original-
ist but a Dworkinian.  Dworkin’s distinction between “concept” and “concep-
tion” (with Dworkin claiming to honor the concept as opposed to the
conception) tracks very closely, if it is not identical to, a distinction between
the original semantic meaning of the words in the text and the concrete
historical understandings of how that text would apply to particular cases.119
So for Rubenfeld, we must choose between “framers’ and ratifiers’ con-
crete historical understandings” or “the semantic or objective linguistic mean-
ing of the words,” with no middle ground.
Rubenfeld’s argument is closely related to a similar move made by Dwor-
kin himself, using the Eighth Amendment and Equal Protection Clause as
examples:
The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution forbids “cruel” and unu-
sual punishment.  Does that mean punishments that the authors thought
118 Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1253 (1997) (footnote omitted).
119 Jed Rubenfeld, Reply to Commentators, 115 YALE L.J. 2093, 2099 (2006).
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were cruel or (what probably comes to the same thing) punishments that
were judged cruel by the popular opinion of their day?  Or does it mean
punishments that are in fact—according to the correct standards for decid-
ing such matters—cruel?  The Fourteenth Amendment says that no state
shall deny any person “equal protection of the laws.”  Does that mean that
no state may deny anyone the equality of treatment that most states have
accorded over our history?  Or does it mean that no state may perpetuate
any distinctions that contradict genuine equal citizenship, whether Ameri-
cans have understood that contradiction before or not?120
Dworkin then translates the rhetorical questions into a version of
Rubenfeld’s point in the following passage:
We have to choose between an abstract, principled, moral reading—the
authors meant to prohibit punishments that are in fact cruel as well as unu-
sual or meant to prohibit whatever discriminations are in fact inconsistent
with equal citizenship—and a concrete, dated reading—they meant to say
that punishments widely thought cruel as well as unusual at the time they
spoke, or discriminations then generally understood to reflect unfair distinc-
tions, are prohibited.121
Just as Rubenfeld argued that we must choose between concrete histori-
cal understandings and linguistic meaning, Dworkin says we must choose
between “a concrete, dated reading” and our general concept of “equal citi-
zenship” or “in fact cruel[ty].”122
Both Rubenfeld and Dworkin assume that the communicative content of
constitutional provisions is either the original expected applications (beliefs
about what particular practices were cruel or consistent with equality) or the
best conception (in the eyes of the interpreter) of the relevant contested
concept.123
The argument that we must choose between the view that original mean-
ing is constituted by original expected applications or Dworkin’s theory of law
as integrity commits the fallacy of the excluded middle.  The assumption of
the argument is that these are the only two alternatives—general concepts or
expected applications.  But in fact there are a variety of views about meaning
that are neither expected applications nor Dworkin’s theory of law as integ-
120 Dworkin, supra note 118, at 1252.
121 Id. at 1253.
122 Id.
123 There is a confusion in Rubenfeld’s version of the argument.  Rubenfeld suggests
that “original semantic meaning” corresponds to Gallie’s notion of “concept” and that
“original expected applications” are the equivalent of “conceptions.”  This is simply a mis-
take.  Assuming that the concept-conception distinction applies, both concepts and con-
ceptions function as providers of semantic content.  If one is using “good” in the sense of a
general concept, the concept has communicative content—which specifies what features a
conception must have in order for that conception to count as a conception of the “good.”
Likewise, particular conceptions of the good (e.g., the hedonic conception) have commu-
nicative content.  Both the concept and the conception have applications and both can
have “expected applications.”  Equating “conception” and “application” is a conceptual
mistake.
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rity.  Most contemporary versions of originalism (including public meaning
originalism) occupy this excluded middle.  Dworkin himself recognizes that
there is another alternative, “ ‘semantic originalism,’ which takes what the
legislators meant collectively to say as decisive of constitutional meaning.”124
As Dworkin recognizes, semantic originalism is very different from “‘expecta-
tion originalism,’ which makes decisive what they expected to accomplish in
saying what they did.”125  And Dworkin further recognizes that semantic
originalism is not his own theory, law as integrity.126
In fact, one position that occupies the excluded middle is provided by
the concept-conception distinction itself.  The concept-conception distinc-
tion assumes that words like “good” have multiple senses.  One sense of
“good” is provided by the general concept of goodness.  When used in this
sense, the content of “good” provides the conditions a conception of good
must meet in order to be a conception of the good.  Someone who used the
word “good” to mean “furniture” would be making a linguistic mistake and
not providing a conception of goodness.127  Another sense of “good” is pro-
vided when a speaker deploys her own conception of goodness.  So when
hedonistic utilitarians say, “Actually, recreational drugs are good for you as
long as they are pleasurable and don’t have painful side effects,” what they
mean by “good” is the hedonistic conception of goodness, not the general
concept and not some other conception.
Dworkin and Rubenfeld commit the fallacy of the excluded middle by
suppressing the possibility that constitutional words and phrases like “cruel,”
“equal protection,” and “freedom of speech” refer to the original concep-
tions of general concepts.  For example, the evidence might suggest that the
phrase “equal protection of the laws” was used to express a particular concep-
tion of equality—the conception held by those who participated in the fram-
ing and ratification of the Equal Protection Clause (or the conception that
prevailed generally at the time).  Call this interpretation the “Original Con-
ceptions Interpretation” and call Dworkin and Rubenfeld’s contrasting inter-
pretation the “Original Concepts Interpretation.”
Once we look at the relevant historical facts, direct evidence of linguistic
practices, and context, we might discover that the Original Conceptions
Interpretation of the relevant provisions is better supported by the direct evi-
dence.  But this Article is not the appropriate venue for the consideration of
the relevant linguistic and contextual facts.  Even for a single word like
124 Dworkin, supra note 118, at 1256.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 1258 n.18 (“I did not mean, in my brief remarks, to abandon either my long-
standing opposition to any form of originalism . . . .”).  Dworkin’s critique of originalism is
found in Law’s Empire. See DWORKIN, supra note 115, at 359–69.  The account in Law’s
Empire is structurally similar to the arguments considered in depth here.
127 Of course, there can be “good furniture” and furniture can be good, but having
furniture as one’s conception of goodness would involve a mistake about the concept.
One can imagine a conception of the good life that involved living conditions of which
furniture was a part, but that would still not be “goodness as furniture.”
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-1\NDL101.txt unknown Seq: 50  8-DEC-15 12:32
50 notre dame law review [vol. 91:1
“cruel” or a phrase like “equal protection,” canvassing the historical evidence
would require an extended treatment—a very long article and not a short
subsection.  Nonetheless, using Dworkin’s own method of armchair specula-
tion, we will be able to show that there are good reasons to prefer the Origi-
nal Conceptions Interpretation.
e. The Case for the Original Conceptions Interpretation
For the purposes of making the case for the Original Conceptions Inter-
pretation of the Equal Protection Clause (or any other similar provision), let
us assume that the concept-conception distinction is correct.  Some words
and phrases have a general-concept sense and multiple senses corresponding
to conceptions of that concept.  “Good” and “right” would be clear examples,
but let us further assume that constitutional words and phrases like “cruel,”
“equal protection,” and “freedom of speech” can be used to express either a
general concept or a particular conception of that concept.
Before we turn to the legal case, let’s investigate the way in which the
concept-conception distinction operates in ordinary discourse.  Suppose Ben
and Alice use the word “right” with respect to the situation in Syria as it
existed in the summer of 2013:
Ben: Unilateral military intervention in support of the rebels in Syria is
clearly the right thing to do after the Government’s massive nerve gas attack.
Alice: What do you mean by “right”?
Ben: I mean that intervention will clearly save more lives than it will cost.
Ordinarily, we use general concept words to express our normative judg-
ments; our use of the words is based on our conception of the concept.  So
Ben is a consequentialist, and his use of “right” reflects a consequentialist
conception of right action.  It would be very odd indeed if the conversation
had gone as follows:
Alice: What do you mean by “right”?
Ben: I mean to refer to the general concept of rightness, whatever that may
be.
Of course, the conversation could continue in that way—especially if
Ben and Alice had just studied Gallie, Rawls, and Dworkin.  But that way of
continuing the conversation would mark a turn from first-order, normative
talk to meta-ethics or theory.
Now consider the possibility that Ben is giving Alice an order that
employs the kind of term that can be used to express a concept or a concep-
tion.  Let us suppose that Ben is a homeowner and that Alice is his real estate
agent:
Ben: Do whatever possible to sell my house at the highest price you can, but
do nothing unfair.128
128 This example is directly borrowed from Dworkin.  Ronald Dworkin, Bork’s Jurispru-
dence, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 662 (1990).
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Alice: What do you mean by “fair”?  There is a Real Estate Code of Ethics,
and it says that agents are permitted to use deceptive tactics in order to
achieve the best price—so long as they do not commit fraud as defined by
law.
Ben: Oh, that’s not what I meant.  When I use the word fair, I mean the kind
of fairness I was taught by my parents.  Deception isn’t fair—even if it isn’t
illegal.
Alice: I understand.
In this conversation, Ben uses “fair” and “unfair” to refer to his concep-
tion of fairness.  This hypothetical is based on one by Dworkin, and we can
imagine a Dworkinian continuation of the conversation that is a bit different.
Ben: Do whatever possible to sell my house at the highest price you can, but
do nothing unfair.
Alice: OK, no bluffing.
Dworkin uses a slightly different scenario to make his point:
Suppose she [Alice in my hypothetical] thinks that a particular negotiating
strategy—bluffing—is unfair, but she knows that I disagree. She might well
think that I had ruled out bluffing even though I did not intend to do so.129
In Dworkin’s version, Alice doesn’t seek clarification and so she con-
cludes that Ben’s initial directive prohibited bluffing, although Ben didn’t
believe that it did so.  This is quite possible because words that can be used to
express either general concepts or different and competing conceptions of
those concepts create ambiguity.  Dworkin observes that Alice might resolve
the ambiguity in a particular way so as to rule out bluffing—even if Ben
would not have thought bluffing is unfair.
Here is the crucial point.  Although it is possible that Ben used “fair” to
express the general concept of fairness, leaving it to Alice to determine what
conception of fairness is best and then to apply that concept to bluffing, this
isn’t necessarily the case.  In fact, Dworkin’s scenario seems rather implausi-
ble.  We can see the implausibility of Dworkin’s position by imagining a con-
tinuation of the conversation, which starts as before:
Ben: Do whatever possible to sell my house at the highest price you can, but
do nothing unfair.
Alice: OK, no bluffing.
Ben: Wait a second!  Bluffing is fair.  Real estate negotiations are like poker
and bluffing is part of the game.
Alice: No, bluffing is unfair.  So “no bluffing” unless you tell me that I should
use unfair methods.
Ben: You don’t understand what I mean by fair.  My understanding of “fair
negotiation” requires honest representations about the underlying facts, but
it does not require disclosure of the negotiator’s intentions.  Given my gen-
129 Id.
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eral understanding of fair negotiation, the particular tactic of bluffing is not
unfair.
Alice: No, my conception of fairness in negotiation is the best conception.
When you said, “nothing unfair,” you meant “unfair according to the true
conception” and not your conception.  So, no bluffing unless you instruct
me to use unfair methods.
Ben: That isn’t what I meant then, and I think I am being perfectly clear
now.  Bluffing is “fair” as I use the word “fair.”  You and I disagree about
fairness, but when you follow my instructions I expect you to be faithful to
my understanding of fairness.  When I used the word “fairness” I used the
word to express my conception and not the general concept.
Alice: No, you did not.  You have told me not to bluff.
At this point, it is apparent that Alice is not “asking what—on the best
evidence available—[Ben] intended to say”130 (as Dworkin himself puts it).
There was an ambiguity about the meaning of fairness.  Ben clarified the
ambiguity by directly stating that he intended to use the word “fair” to
express his conception of fairness in negotiation.  When Alice refuses to
accept the clarification, she is no longer engaging in the enterprise of
attempting to understand Ben on the basis of the best evidence of what he
intended to say.  Rather, she is disregarding his instructions and substituting
her own.
Notice that in this example, Ben does not offer an expected applications
interpretation of his own utterance.  Rather, his understanding of what he
meant by “fair” is abstract: he offers a conception of fairness in negotiation.
He reasons from that conception to a conclusion about a particular practice,
bluffing, but he does not say that by “fair,” he meant to convey “bluffing is
OK” as the communicative content of “fair.”  Ben is not reducing the mean-
ing of fair to expected applications.
Now consider the legal case.  Using the method of armchair speculation,
we can ask whether someone writing a constitution would use words and
phrases like “cruel,” “equal protection,” or “freedom of speech” in their gen-
eral concept senses, or whether they would be more likely to employ these
words and phrases to express some particular conception of the general con-
cept.  Of course, if they recognized the ambiguity and its potential impor-
tance down the line, they might have used less ambiguous language.  For
example, they might have said, “cruel as generally understood at the time this
provision was written”, or “equal protection understood as prohibiting any
discrimination on the basis of race or former condition of servitude”, or
“freedom of speech as specified by the best theory of political morality”, or
alternatively, “the right to freedom of speech at common law shall be pre-
served.”131  But as we have seen, this kind of disambiguation is rare in ordi-
130 Dworkin, supra note 118, at 1252.
131 Similar phrasing was in fact used on the Seventh Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend.
VII (“The right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be
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nary conversation and even normal legal drafting: such explicit
disambiguation is only likely to occur in theoretical discussions.
One option is simply unavailable to us.  We cannot write a legal com-
mand that will guarantee that law appliers (future judges or officials) will
always use the best or true conception of contested concepts.  One of the
reasons that contested concepts are the subject of disagreement is what Rawls
calls “the fact of pluralism.”132  In a democratic society, there are likely to be
disagreements about which conception of rightness, goodness, fairness, and
so on, is the best conception.  So if we were to draft a constitution that unam-
biguously required future judges to use the best conception of general con-
cepts like fairness, we could not guarantee that this is what they would do.
The only thing they can do is use their own best judgment.  Inevitably, their
own best judgment will reflect their own beliefs.  To the extent that these
questions of constitutional meaning are politically salient, it is likely that the
processes for selecting judges will take their beliefs into account.
Majoritarian politics do not guarantee correct moral judgments; moral cor-
rectness is only one of the many motivations (some venal, some noble) that
shape the outcome of political processes.
Take the situation of the Reconstruction Congress adopting the Equal
Protection Clause.  Suppose the members of the Reconstruction Congress
believed that the best conception of equal protection permitted or required
what we now call “affirmative action” in some circumstances.  And suppose
they recognized that by using the phrase, “equal protection,” they were invit-
ing a future court to decide that they intended to use the general concept
and not any particular conception.  And that future court might invalidate
affirmative action, because the court might decide that the best conception
of equal protection requires strict racial neutrality.  It seems likely that if they
were to anticipate this development, they would attempt to foreclose this pos-
sibility by expressing their own conception of equal protection
unambiguously.
Now consider the possibility that the Reconstruction Congress drafted
the Equal Protection Clause without explicitly considering the concept-con-
ception distinction.  Is it more natural to interpret the language they chose as
expressing the general concept or their own conception?  In ordinary
speech, it is natural to use words and phrases to express our own conceptions
of contested concepts.  Ordinarily, we use these terms to express our own
judgments, evaluations, and normative wishes—and not to talk about theo-
retical disagreement about contested concepts.  So in the absence of evi-
dence to the contrary, if we are seeking the intended meaning of
constitutional language that could be used to express the concepts or con-
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law.”).
132 John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 765–66 (1997)
(“[A] basic feature of democracy is the fact of reasonable pluralism—the fact that a plural-
ity of conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious, philosophical, and moral,
is the normal result of its culture of free institutions.” (footnote omitted)).
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ceptions, we are likely to believe that the evidence points to the Original
Conceptions Interpretation and not the General Concept Interpretation.
We can generalize the points made in the last two paragraphs.  Dwor-
kin’s account of the communicative intentions of the Framers of various con-
stitutional provisions actually works fairly well under certain ideal conditions.
Suppose that the world were such that judges were very good at discovering
the truths of political morality and that their opinions routinely were under-
stood by a wide and deep consensus among citizens as having done just that.
In that possible world, we can imagine that the framers of a new constitution
or an amendment to the existing constitution would have the communicative
intentions that Dworkin argues actual framers have.  In this possible world,
framers can rely on judges to get it right—to articulate conceptions of “equal-
ity,” “freedom of speech,” and “cruelty” that are both correct and legitimate
(legitimate in the positive sense of legitimacy, because they are seen to be
correct by citizens).  That is, Dworkin’s theory works well under certain ideal-
izing assumptions—it is an “ideal theory.”
Now imagine a different world.  In this world, judges are not especially
good at discovering moral truths.  These judges are selected by political
processes; their positions on various issues must be acceptable to the execu-
tive who appoints them and the legislators who confirm them.  In this world,
the judges disagree among themselves about questions of morality and are
controversial among citizens.  When a political movement is able to obtain a
supermajority that enables constitutional change, they do not trust future
judges to get morality right.  Instead, the whole point of their movement is to
entrench their constitutional vision.
Real-world constitution makers (like the Framers of the Reconstruction
Amendments) are not likely to understand constitution drafting as an exer-
cise in ideal theory.  Rather, they draft for the real world of politics and disa-
greement.  They know that in the real world, moral conceptions are sticky—it
is always difficult and sometimes impossible to dislodge them with moral
argument.  And if the time frame is the span of time allowed an appellate
court judge to decide a case (from when the judge first reads the briefs to the
conference after oral argument), then the likelihood that deliberation will
track moral reality (and not the judge’s priors) seems almost vanishingly
small.  If offered a choice between entrenching their conception of a con-
tested concept, on the one hand, and “kicking the can down the road” to
future judges, on the other, they will choose their own conception every
time.
One can imagine various replies to this argument.  For example, it might
be argued that the drafters of a particular constitutional provision disagreed
among themselves about substance.  Perhaps there were various factions in
the Reconstruction Congress and “equal protection” was intended to mean
“the concept of equality” and not any particular conception.  This would be
an example of deliberate ambiguity; the drafters of the Equal Protection
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-1\NDL101.txt unknown Seq: 55  8-DEC-15 12:32
2015] the  fixation  thesis 55
Clause would have “kicked the can down the road.”133  Absent knowledge of
the historical facts, this is a possibility, but to establish this argument, the
proponents of the General Concept Interpretation would need to show that
this is in fact what occurred.  So far as I know, no one has made a convincing
case for the deliberate ambiguity argument about the Equal Protection
Clause,134 but I do know that we cannot settle this question by appealing to
armchair speculation.
The next step would be to examine the historical facts, but that requires
a systematic investigation of linguistic practices and context—a task that is
outside the scope of this Article.
f. The Concept-Conception Argument and the Fixation Thesis
After this extended discussion of the Concept-Conception Argument, we
are now in a position to ask how the argument affects the Fixation Thesis.
The first point follows directly from the discussion above.135  The actual sub-
stance of the concept-conception distinction does not work to show that the
meaning of particular constitutional provisions cannot be a fixed conception,
even for those provisions where the language of the provision includes a
word or phrase that is plausibly understood as having a sense that refers to a
general concept of which there are multiple competing conceptions.
The second and more important point may come as a surprise.  Even if
the Dworkinian version of the concept-conception were correct, it would not
form the basis of an objection to the Fixation Thesis per se.  The Fixation
Thesis claims that the communicative content of the text is fixed at the time
each provision is framed and ratified.  The Concept-Conception Argument, if
it were true, would establish that the communicative content of certain provi-
sions is limited to a general concept.  For example, if Dworkin’s argument
worked, then the communicative content of “equal protection” might be the
general concept of equality.  This creates a special kind of irreducible ambi-
guity as between eligible conceptions of the concept.136  From the perspec-
133 I am grateful to Michael Corliss for pressing this objection.
134 It has been suggested to me that this argument can be found in William Nelson’s
book. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988).  Nelson certainly does believe that there were disagreements
among the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment, but these disagreements
are about purposes and aims.  For example, different members of Congress may have had
different motives for voting to propose the amendment for ratification and different hopes
about how it would be put into operation.  I do not see a single sentence in his book
suggesting that these disagreements were deliberately translated into semantic ambiguities
in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment.
135 See supra subsections III.B.1.a–e.
136 Advocates of the concept-conception distinction might argue that the meaning just
is best conception of the concept, but given the fact of pluralism there will frequently be
disagreement about which conception is best.  From a systemic perspective, this creates a
special form of irreducible ambiguity, with different constitutional actors interpreting the
text as referring to different conceptions.  In Supreme Court cases, there might be some
cases in which a stable majority would coalesce around a particular conception, but it
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tive of originalists who accept the interpretation-construction distinction, this
irreducible ambiguity creates a construction zone, limited by the boundaries
of the concept.  Nothing about this story is inconsistent with the Fixation
Thesis.
It turns out that the real point of the Concept-Conception Argument is
not to deny fixation; the real point is to expand the construction zone.  In
other words, general concepts are relatively more underdeterminate than are
particular conceptions.  So long as the boundaries created by the general
concept are respected, Dworkinian elaboration of the best version of a consti-
tutional concept is consistent with the Constraint Principle as well.  That is,
the Concept-Conception Argument accepts that the meaning of a general
concept word, even when it is used in its general-concept meaning, is fixed.
So the Concept-Conception Argument does not threaten the core of the
originalist family of constitutional theories, fixation and constraint.  The real
action created by the Concept-Conception Argument is an argument that the
communicative content does not provide as much constraint as some
originalists might hope.  To make out that argument in a convincing way,
there needs to be an investigation of the relevant evidence, the historical
facts regarding linguistic practices and context.  At this point in the dialectic,
that argument has not moved beyond the method of armchair speculation.
But even using Dworkin’s own method, there is very good reason to reject his
conclusions.
2. Natural Kinds
At this point, some advocates of the Concept-Conception Argument may
have a complaint.  They might say something along the following lines:
We see what you have said about concept and conceptions, but that was
never really the basis of our argument.  What we really meant to say is that
the Constitution uses moral terms that require us to investigate moral truths.
We did not mean that the general and abstract moral language of the Con-
stitution is underdeterminate; we meant to say that it clearly requires judges
do what is really required by an injunction to achieve equality, avoid cruelty,
and protect the freedom of expression.  Judges must seek the true essence of
these moral concepts.
This argument might seem to have a superficial resemblance to the
argument based on Gallie’s idea of essentially contested concepts, but it is
different in important ways.  The new version of the argument is premised on
the idea that the moral language of the Constitution points to concepts that
have objective criteria for their application.  Rather than contested concepts,
we have moral truths.  The difference between the Concept-Conception
Argument and the new argument is enormous and profound.
would also be possible that no single conception would command a majority (two votes for
conception A, three votes for conception B, and four votes for conception C) or that the
conceptions would vary over time with changing compositions of the Court.
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The most powerful expression of the new argument’s view borrows from
the idea of a natural kind, strongly associated with Hilary Putnam and Saul
Kripke.137  Consider a natural-kind term like “gold” or “water.”  When the
connection between the word “gold” and the substance with a certain atomic
structure was first established (through a kind of dubbing), the connection
between the word and the natural kind was fixed.  This connection does not
depend on the psychological states of individual language users.  Thus, even
if I mistakenly believe that pyrite (fool’s gold) is gold, I do not refer to pyrite
when I use the word “gold.”  The nature of gold, water, or other natural
kinds is given by our best scientific theories—even when those theories fail to
correspond to linguistic conventions.
The actual Constitution of the United States does contain a clause that
refers to gold.  Article One, Section Ten provides:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Let-
ters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing
but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder,
ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant
any Title of Nobility.138
Let us call the italicized portion of this clause the “Legal Tender Clause.”
The Natural-Kinds Theory suggests that the meaning of “gold” in the
gold and silver legal tender clause is limited to instances of the element gold
as specified by the best scientific theory of the elements.  The material used
to make coins or held in reserve to back paper money would have to have the
right atomic structure, including the atomic number seventy-nine (represent-
ing seventy-nine protons), six energy levels with the appropriate number of
electrons at each level, and so forth.
This point can be illustrated by a thought experiment.  Suppose that
pyrite were functionally indistinguishable from gold (soft, malleable, ductile
metal, same color, same weight per cubic centimeter, etc.).  Nonetheless, it
would not be gold.  And even if the fictional framers believed that this fic-
tional version of pyrite were gold, that belief would not control the meaning
of the word “gold,” because the word refers to the natural kind.
If we try to apply this theory to other provisions in the Constitution, it
looks like we will not be able to rely directly on the sort of natural kinds
investigated by the physical sciences.  Equality, cruelty, and freedom of
speech are moral concepts—or have some moral content.  Nonetheless, it
might be the case that there are moral kinds, legal kinds, or as Michael
Moore puts it, “functional kinds.”139  Unlike natural kinds, the essence of
which is given by their microstructure (e.g., atomic structure in the case of
137 See generally SAUL A. KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (1980); 2 HILARY PUTNAM, The
Meaning of “Meaning”, in 2 MIND, LANGUAGE AND REALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 215–71
(1975).
138 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (emphasis added).
139 See Michael S. Moore, Law as a Functional Kind, in NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEM-
PORARY ESSAYS 188, 208 (Robert P. George ed., 1992).  Moore’s development of the func-
tional kinds idea is the most sophisticated version of which I am aware.
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elements), the essence of a functional kind would be given by its function.
This is a terribly brief and wholly inadequate statement of a very complex and
sophisticated theory, but this brief exposition will have to do for present pur-
poses.  Let us call this version of the theory the “Functional Kinds Theory.”
Suppose then that the constitutional text employs functional kinds and
that phrases like “equal protection” and “freedom of speech” point to kinds
of this sort.  Is this account of constitutional meaning consistent with the
Fixation Thesis?  The answer to this question is obviously yes.  Once the
phrase “equal protection” becomes associated with the corresponding func-
tional kind, the meaning of the phrase is fixed.  Even if a Functional Kinds
Theory of the meaning of the constitutional text were to incorporate a theory
of linguistic drift, such that a word or phrase could lose its connection with a
natural or functional kind (with a new term emerging for the kind and the
old term acquiring a new meaning140), it would still be the case that the
meaning of the relevant token text (e.g., the official draft of the Constitution
promulgated in 1787) remains fixed.  The relevant functional kind would be
the kind to which the constitutional word or phrase was associated at the
time the relevant provision was framed and ratified.
Indeed, the standard account of natural-kind terms is structurally similar
to originalism.  A natural-kind term becomes associated with its kind by an
act of “dubbing.”  Once dubbing has occurred, the relationship between the
term and the kind is fixed.141  This relationship between the term and the
natural kind is similar to the relationship between proper names and the
particulars of which they are names: thus, “Lawrence Byard Solum” is my
name, and the meaning of my name was fixed at the time my parents named
me; let us call this event my “baptism.”142  The word “baptism” (used to refer
to naming ceremonies) is used interchangeably with “dubbing” in philosoph-
ical accounts of the relationship between natural-kind terms and their refer-
ents.143  The meaning of my name is its original meaning fixed at the time of
140 Gareth Evans uses the example of Madagascar to illustrate semantic drift in the case
of proper names. See Gareth Evans, The Causal Theory of Names, 47 PROC. OF THE ARISTOTE-
LIAN SOC. 187–208 (Supp.) (1973).  The name “Madagascar” originally referred to a region
on the mainland of Africa, but later became associated with the island now called “Mada-
gascar” as the result of a misunderstanding. See Sam Cumming, Names, STAN. ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Mar. 19, 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/names/.
141 See, e.g., Corine Besson, Rigidity, Natural Kind Terms, and Metasemantics, in THE
SEMANTICS AND METAPHYSICS OF NATURAL KINDS, 25, 38–41 (Helen Beebee & Nigel Sab-
barton-Leary eds., 2010).
142 See Cumming, supra note 140 § 2.5 (“[T]he reference of a name is established by a
dubbing ceremony (or ‘baptism’) at which the dubee is indicated by a demonstration or
uniquely referring description.  All uses of the name that derive from this source (uses
deriving from the baptism itself, or acquired from someone who was present at the bap-
tism, or from someone who acquired it from someone who was present at the baptism,
etc.) refer to the original dubee, even if the speaker associates the name with a description
that is untrue of that dubee.” (emphasis added)).
143 See id.; Besson, supra note 141, at 38–41.
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my baptism.  The meanings of natural-kind terms are their original meanings
fixed at the time of dubbing.
Moreover, the Functional Kinds Theory is consistent with the Constraint
Principle.  Indeed, to the extent that the constitutional text points to func-
tional kinds with real essences, it seems likely that the case for constraint
might be very strong indeed.  This is especially true in the case of functional
kinds that have moral content.  If freedom of expression is a real functional
kind and the meaning of the First Amendment free speech clause is fixed to
that kind, then one can imagine a variety of arguments for following this
meaning.  Moreover, the Functional Kinds Theory may lead to the minimiza-
tion of underdeterminacy.  If freedom of speech has a real functional struc-
ture that can be discovered, then it might turn out that it really does provide
determinate answers to a wide variety of questions that we would otherwise
believe are in the construction zone.
Nonetheless, some originalists may be uncomfortable with the Func-
tional Kinds Theory of constitutional meaning.  This discomfort could have
several causes.  Some originalists may simply reject the notion that constitu-
tional words and phrases name functional kinds with real essences.  But even
originalists who accepted this theory might doubt the institutional capacity of
judges to reliably track the real essences of the functional kinds when they
decide constitutional cases.  There may be epistemological problems; even if
relevant functional kinds have real essences, it does not necessarily follow
that we can discover them.  And even if the ideal judge can do this, there may
be problems of social epistemology.  The institutional practices that constrain
judges might make it difficult for actual judges to make decisions that reliably
reflect the true natures of the functional kinds.  In particular, originalists
might fear that the implementation of a functional kinds view will result in
judges who simply rely on their own, ideologically determined beliefs.  That
is, content that is determinate in theory might be underdeterminate in
practice.
But so far as the thesis of this Article is concerned, epistemological or
practical underdeterminacy is beside the main point.  The Functional Kinds
Theory is fully consistent with the Fixation Thesis—and with the Constraint
Principle.  Moreover, the Functional Kinds Theory entails metaphysical (but
not epistemic) determinacy.
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3. Family Resemblance and Open Texture
Consider a third objection,144 inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein’s idea of
family resemblance145 and the related notion of “open texture,” developed
by Friedrich Waismann as an extension of Wittgenstein’s idea.146  Wais-
mann’s notion of open texture was subsequently used by H.L.A. Hart.147
The basic idea of the objection is that at least some constitutional provisions
are open-textured—there are no necessary and sufficient criteria for the
application.  Put in terms of family resemblance, the point is that the mean-
ing of these provisions is like family resemblance.  Two brothers may share
many characteristics in common with each other, and some of these may be
shared with their mother, but while their mother may resemble her sister—
their aunt—the two brothers may have little in common with their aunt, and
nothing at all in in common with their aunt’s daughter, their cousin.  They
are all members of the same family, but there is no set of features that all the
members of the family share.
How might the notion of family resemblance relate to interpretation of
the constitutional text?  The argument might be that the Fixation Thesis
assumes that the meaning of the constitutional text is static on the basis of a
false picture of how meaning works.  That picture assumes that words and
phrases have a static meaning that consists of a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions for the application of the word or phrase.  This picture is false,
because the meaning of language is dynamic—there are no necessary and
sufficient conditions for the application of a word to things in the world.
Rather, words are adapted to new uses, gradually extending to new cases and
144 For a version of this objection, see Ian Bartrum, Constructing the Constitutional Canon:
The Metonymic Evolution of Federalist 10, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 9, 11–12 (2010); Bartrum,
supra note 28, at 160.
Bartrum suggests that the Fixation Thesis claims that meanings are themselves empiri-
cal facts about the world and then correctly observes that not all meanings work this way,
citing words like “not” and expressions like “LOL.” Id. at 167.  Although I do claim that
there is a fact of the matter about the communicative content of an utterance or writing, I
have never claimed that all meanings are facts about the world.  Bartrum also argues that
in “‘hard’ cases language and text ultimately fail to capture a specific semantic meaning.”
Id. at 175.  Bartrum does not elucidate his notion of “specific meaning.”  My best guess is
that by “specific” he means “determinate.”  If this is correct, then his objection does not go
to the Fixation Thesis but is instead a point about underdetermination.
145 See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 67–77, 108 (P.M.S.
Hacker & Joachim Schulte eds., G.E.M. Anscombe et al. trans., 4th ed. 2009).
146 Dr. Friedrich Waismann, Verifiability, in LOGIC AND LANGUAGE (Antony Flew ed.
1951), republication from 19 PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOC., SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME XIX
(1945).
147 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 127–28 (Peter Cane et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994)
(“Whichever device, precedent or legislation, is chosen for the communication of stan-
dards of behaviour, these, however smoothly they work over the great mass of ordinary
cases, will, at some point where their application is in question, prove indeterminate; they
will have what has been termed an open texture.”).
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withdrawing from old ones.  For this reason, one can never know at any point
in time what a word will extend to and what it will not.
Take “freedom of speech” for example.  If the freedom of speech is
open-textured (or is a family resemblance concept), then at any given point
in time there will be cases where we will not be able to say whether these
cases are (or are not) covered by the freedom of speech—even if we knew
everything that could be known about existing linguistic practice.  And over
time, the phrase “freedom of speech” might come to cover situations that
were clearly outside its boundaries at an earlier point in time.
This suggests that the argument against fixation from open texture or
family resemblance has two different aspects.  The first aspect is synchronic:
at any given point in time, an open-textured provision of the Constitution
will underdetermine the set of applications.  The second aspect is diachronic:
over an extended period of time, the set of cases to which a provision clearly
applies (or clearly does not apply) can change.
Consider the relationship of each of these two aspects of open texture or
family resemblance to the Fixation Thesis.  The synchronic aspect of open
texture is fully consistent with the idea that the meaning of constitutional
language is fixed at the time a constitutional provision is framed and ratified.
Indeed, this aspect of open texture is fully embraced by originalists who
accept the existence of the construction zone created by vagueness or irre-
ducible ambiguity: open texture can be viewed as a special kind of mul-
tidimensional vagueness (or perhaps as a special sort of irreducible
ambiguity).  While conventional vagueness exists in a single dimension (as
with height and the word “tall”), open texture exists when a word or phrase is
vague in multiple dimensions, as may be the case with a complex (mul-
tidimensional) notion such as freedom of speech.  So long as competent
speakers of the language can distinguish clear cases (in the core of settled
meaning) from the cases where the application of the constitutional provi-
sion is unsettled (in the penumbra), the Fixation Thesis holds.
What about the diachronic aspect of open texture?  Can the fact that
core and penumbra shift over time be reconciled with the Fixation Thesis?
Once again, the Fixation Thesis not only can accommodate the fact that
meanings change over time, that fact (which is one of the mechanisms which
enables linguistic drift) is a central motivation for originalism.  If the mean-
ing of the words and phrases used in the constitutional text did not change
over time, then there would be no distinction between the original meaning
of the text and the contemporary meaning.  The Fixation Thesis does not
claim that word types have static meaning: that claim would rather obviously
be false, because it is inconsistent with the phenomenon of linguistic drift.148
Rather, the Fixation Thesis claims that word tokens have static (but not fully
determinate) meanings.
148 Or at least, the claim that meanings are static is obviously false for terms that are not
“rigid designators,” as proper names and natural-kinds terms are alleged to be. See Joseph
LaPorte, Rigid Designators, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Oct. 24, 2006), http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/rigid-designators/.
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IV. THE RIVALS OF FIXATION
So far our investigation of the Fixation Thesis has focused on the case
for the fixation of communicative content and answers to objections.  This
Part examines the rivals of fixation, competing theories of constitutional
meaning that implicitly or explicitly deny that “meaning” is fixed.  The first
and most obvious rival of originalism accepts the phenomenon of linguistic
drift, but argues that the contemporary meaning of the text should guide
constitutional interpretation and construction.
A. Contemporary Readers’ Meaning (or “Fictional Meaning”)
There is another account of meaning that might form the basis of an
objection to the Fixation Thesis.  Texts have meanings for readers.  Let us
call the meaning a text has for a community of readers, the “readers’ mean-
ing” of the text.  Of course, different readers may understand a text differ-
ently, but let us assume that at any particular point in time, the community of
contemporary readers of a text will have a shared understanding of the
meaning of the constitutional text.  We can call this the “Contemporary
Readers’ Meaning Theory” of constitutional interpretation.149  This abstract
theory has variations, corresponding to different specifications of the rele-
vant interpretive community.  One such community would be the general
public.  The theory that is now on the table claims that the relevant meaning
of the constitutional text is given by the communicative content that is
grasped by the public at large now (or in the future at a particular point in
time).
Something like this view may have been articulated by the eminent
Canadian constitutional scholar Peter Hogg: “Under the doctrine of progres-
sive interpretation the words of the text are given a meaning that seems natu-
ral to contemporary eyes, not a meaning that has been distilled from
historical records extrinsic to the actual text.”150  The consequence of this
view would be that linguistic drift would change the communicative content
149 This theory is inspired by the early views, since modified, of Stanley Fish. See STAN-
LEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 157–59 (1989); Stanley E. Fish, Interpreting the
Variorum, 2 CRITICAL INQUIRY, 465, 483–85.  Fish’s current position is a version of inten-
tionalism. See Stanley Fish, The Intentionalist Thesis Once More, in THE CHALLENGE OF
ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 99, 113 (Grant Huscroft &
Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011).
150 Peter W. Hogg, The Charter of Rights and American Theories of Interpretation, 25
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 87, 101–02 (1987).  It is not clear whether Hogg denies fixation,
because his statement could be read as referring to legal content (and not communicative
content).  If that was what he intended, he denies the Constraint Principle but not the
Fixation Thesis.
Tom Bell has argued for a version of Contemporary Meaning Theory. See Tom W.
Bell, The Constitution as if Consent Mattered, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 269 (2013).  Hillel Levin has
developed a Contemporary Meaning Theory of statutory interpretation. See Hillel Y. Levin,
Contemporary Meaning and Expectations in Statutory Interpretation, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1103
(2012).
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of the constitutional text: if “domestic violence” now means violence within
the family, then that meaning could determine the communicative content
of the Guarantee Clause.
Contemporary Readers’ Meaning might be combined with a theory of
contemporary ratification, a version of which was sketched by Justice William
Brennan.151  The idea would be that the legitimacy of the Constitution is a
function of its contemporary acceptance by “We the People.”  But this accept-
ance is based on Contemporary Readers’ Meaning—the way the text is
understood today.  Therefore, the argument might go, the normatively legiti-
mate communicative content of the text is derived from the way the text is
understood today by today’s readers on the basis of contemporary semantics
and context.
There is a deep difficulty with the Contemporary Readers’ Meaning The-
ory; this difficulty requires a bit of explanation.  How do contemporary read-
ers approach an old text?  Consider again the example of the thirteenth-
century letter that uses the word “deer.”  Suppose that you are a contempo-
rary reader, and that you know (1) that the letter was written in the thir-
teenth century, and (2) that the semantic meaning of “deer” at that time was
equivalent to the modern phrase “four-legged mammal.”  Under these cir-
cumstances, it would be natural for you to understand “deer” as meaning
four-legged mammal.  This process is quite similar to reading a letter in a
dialect that is similar to (but distinct from) standard American English.  In
other words, our ordinary way of reading older texts is based on our intuitive
understanding of the Generalized Fixation Thesis.  Thus, the Contemporary
Readers’ Meaning Theory collapses into the Fixation Thesis.152
We can fix up the theory in the following way:  we ask what contempo-
rary readers would think the constitutional text meant if they were to assume
that the text were written today (or in the very recent past).153  Of course, the
The Contemporary Meaning Theory may (or may not) be related to the “always speak-
ing” doctrine (that is sometimes articulated in Commonwealth legal systems).  On the doc-
trine, see Regina v. Burstow [1997] (HL), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
ld199798/ldjudgmt/jd970724/irland01.htm.  If the always-speaking doctrine is an asser-
tion about communicative content, then it is simply false.  If it is a rule of construction (as
opposed to interpretation), then it is consistent with the Fixation Thesis.
151 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification,
27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433 (1986).
152 The way that contemporary readers would understand an old text if they were made
aware of variations in semantics and context is not necessarily identical to the way they do
read the text.  Contemporary readers may misunderstand the constitutional text, because
of false beliefs about semantics and context.
153 This hypothetical bears at least a superficial resemblance to the “always speaking”
doctrine found in some common-law systems.  Here is one recent articulation:
If the interpretation of older statutes is to be realistic and meaningful, it is neces-
sary that a court undertaking this exercise should interpret statutes according to
their contemporary meaning at the time of interpretation.  The basic interpreta-
tive rule governing this area is the presumption that legislation is always speaking
from the present; that each enactment is to be viewed as a living part of the cur-
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hypothetical assumption that the Constitution was written today is a fiction
(or counterfactual).  Let us call the modified version of the theory the “Fic-
tional Contemporary Readers’ Meaning Theory” (or the “Fictional Meaning
Theory” for short) of constitutional interpretation.  And this brings us to the
deep difficulty: the counterfactual assumption is based on the Type Meaning
Fallacy.  The Fictional Meaning Theory is not a theory of the meaning of the
actual Constitution—the collection of tokens that begins with the copy of the
Constitution that is preserved in the National Archives.  Rather, it is a theory
of the meaning of a nonexistent constitutional text that hypothetically was
written today.
For this reason, the Fictional Meaning Theory is not a true rival of the
Fixation Thesis.  The Fixation Thesis can accept that a fictional token of the
constitutional type would not have its meaning fixed at the times that each
provision of the actual Constitution was framed and ratified.  Of course, the
Generalized Fixation Thesis claims in the possible worlds in which a given
fictional constitution was written in the present, the meaning of that fictional
constitution was fixed at that time.  Hence, the fictional constitution written
today would have a meaning fixed by today’s conventional semantic mean-
ings and the fictional context in which the constitution is imagined to have
been framed and ratified.  For this reason, the Fictional Meaning Theory
must posit a potentially endless succession of hypothetical constitutions—
each of which potentially has a different meaning.
At this point, it may strike some readers that the Fictional Meaning The-
ory is positing epicycles that render it implausible when compared with the
simpler and intuitively more plausible view that communicative content is
fixed and that the content should constrain constitutional practice.  But the
important point is that the Fictional Meaning Theory does not deny the
claim made by the Fixation Thesis.  The Fixation Thesis is a claim about par-
ticular tokens—the authoritative embodiments of the constitutional text as
the original Constitution and each amendment was framed and ratified.  The
claim made by the Contemporary Meaning Theory does not deny that this
meaning is fixed; rather it simply points to alternative communicative con-
tent that we would give to another token text of the same type.  To the extent
that the Fictional Meaning Theory is combined with a theory of contempo-
rary ratification, the combination targets the Constraint Principle and not
the Fixation Thesis.  It argues that the original meaning of the actual Consti-
tution should not constrain; the combined theory does not deny that the
communicative content of the constitutional text is fixed.
rent legal system and not limited by circumstances which were current at the time
of its enactment.
THE LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT ON STATUTORY DRAFTING AND INTERPRETATION: PLAIN
LANGUAGE AND THE LAW, § 3.02 (2000) (Ir.), http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/
Reports/rPlainLanguage.htm.  It is not clear, however, that the notion that the law always
speaks is a doctrine of interpretation (as opposed to construction).  The charitable under-
standing of the metaphor is that it expresses the idea that statutes must be applied to new
circumstances—and not that their meaning changes because of linguistic drift.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-1\NDL101.txt unknown Seq: 65  8-DEC-15 12:32
2015] the  fixation  thesis 65
Neither the Contemporary Readers’ Meaning Theory nor its cousin, the
Fictional Meaning Theory, provides a basis for rejecting the Fixation Thesis.
Informed contemporary readers understand old texts in light of the syntax
and context at the time the text was written.  The fact that a fictional constitu-
tion, written today, would have a different meaning than the actual Constitu-
tion actually demonstrates that the Fixation Thesis is true—as applied to the
original token of the constitutional text.
B. Constructive Interpretation
Ronald Dworkin calls his general interpretive method (including his
view of constitutional interpretation and construction) “constructive inter-
pretation.”154  Dworkin is sometimes hard to pin down, and his theory was
elaborated in many texts over the course of five decades.  One understanding
of Dworkin might be that because constructive interpretation aims to make
our practices “the best that they can be” in light of the institutional history,
his theory implies that meanings can change over time.  Our “moral read-
ings” of the constitutional text are not fixed, but instead evolve in response to
changing circumstances and our evolving constitutional values.155
But is this correct?  Or is Dworkin’s theory actually consistent with the
Fixation Thesis?  There are very good reasons to think that Dworkin actually
accepts fixation (as applied to communicative content).  For example, in
1997, he introduced an example from Milton’s Paradise Lost:
Hamlet said to his sometime friends, “I know a hawk from a handsaw.”  The
question arises—it arises for somebody playing the role, for example—
whether Hamlet was using the word “hawk” that designates a kind of a bird,
or the different word that designates a Renaissance tool.  Milton spoke, in
Paradise Lost, of Satan’s “gay hordes.”  Was Milton reporting that Satan’s
disciples were gaily dressed or that they were homosexual?156
His answer to these questions seems to endorse the Fixation Thesis in all
but name.  The italics mark emphasis that I have added:
We must begin, in my view, by asking what—on the best evidence availa-
ble—the authors of the text in question intended to say.  That is an exercise
in what I have called constructive interpretation.  It does not mean peeking
inside the skulls of people dead for centuries.  It means trying to make the
best sense we can of an historical event—someone, or a social group with
particular responsibilities, speaking or writing in a particular way on a partic-
ular occasion.  If we apply that standard to Hamlet, it’s plain that we must
read his claim as referring not to a bird, which would make the claim an
extremely silly one, but to a renaissance tool.  Hamlet assured his treacher-
154 DWORKIN, supra note 115, at 62–86 (1986).
155 The phrase “moral reading” is Dworkin’s, see RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW:
THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2–3 (1996), but it is now strongly
associated with James Fleming’s Dworkinian theory of constitutional interpretation and
construction, see James E. Fleming, Fidelity, Change, and the Good Constitution, 62 AM. J.
COMP. L. 515, 515 (2014).
156 Dworkin, supra note 118, at 1251–52.
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ous companions that he knew the difference between kinds of tools and
knew which kind he was dealing with in them. In the case of poor Satan’s gay
hordes, there’s a decisive reason for thinking that Milton meant to describe them as
showy, not homosexual, which is that the use of “gay” to mean homosexual postdated
Milton by centuries.157
In the italicized passage, Dworkin recognizes the phenomenon of lin-
guistic drift and argues that the relevant “meaning” of the word “gay” is a
function of its conventional semantic meaning at the time Milton wrote.
Dworkin goes on to explicate the concept-conception distinction, which we
have already discussed.  Recall that Dworkin’s critique of Scalia was simply
fallacious and that his affirmative argument that essentially contested con-
cept words must have been intended to express the concept and not a con-
ception of that concept was speculative and likely wrong.
But that is not the end of the matter.  Dworkin continues to discuss the
role of the text in constitutional practice, juxtaposing his view with that of
Laurence Tribe.  Here is the passage, which includes an internal (double-
indented) quotation from Tribe.
Tribe endorses a very strong form of textual fidelity.  Tribe states:
I nonetheless share with Justice Scalia the belief that the Constitution’s
written text has primacy and must be deemed the ultimate point of depar-
ture; that nothing irreconcilable with the text can properly be considered
part of the Constitution; and that some parts of the Constitution cannot
plausibly be open to significantly different interpretations.
That is a stronger statement of textual fidelity than I [Dworkin] would myself
endorse, because, as I said, precedent and practice over time can, in princi-
ple, supersede even so basic a piece of interpretive data as the Constitution’s
text when no way of reconciling them all in an overall constructive interpre-
tation can be found.  I agree with the Tribe of this statement, however, that
the text must have a very important role: We must aim at a set of constitu-
tional principles that we can defend as consistent with the most plausible
interpretation we have of what the text itself says, and be very reluctant to
settle for anything else.158
Dworkin does not use the same conceptual vocabulary as we have been
employing here, but his point can be translated.  Dworkin recognizes that the
communicative content of a text is fixed at the time the text is written.  But in
the case of the constitutional text, the legal content of constitutional doc-
trine can change, because the “constructive interpretation” of the law as a
whole can override the communicative content.  In other words, Dworkin
accepts fixation as a thesis about “interpretation” (communicative content),
but rejects the Constraint Principle.
But even if Dworkin himself does not reject the Fixation Thesis, it may
be that one could construct a different version of his theory that applied his
notion of constructive interpretation to communicative content.  And per-
157 Id. at 1252 (emphasis added).
158 Id. at 1259–60 (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER
OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 65, 77 (1997)).
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haps Dworkin himself did this in Justice for Hedgehogs, his penultimate mono-
graph.159  Elsewhere,160 I have argued that in this late work, Dworkin argues
for what I call the Unity of Interpretation Thesis—the claim that all “inter-
pretation” involves the same essential structure.  Here is the key passage:
We find it natural to report our conclusions, in each and every genre of
interpretation, in the language of intention or purpose.  We speak of the
meaning or significance of a passage in a poem or a play, of the point of a
clause in a particular statute, of the motives that produced a particular
dream, of the ambitions or understandings that shaped an event or an
age.161
What does Dworkin mean by “purpose”?  He does not mean the psycho-
logical state that constitutes the motive of the author of the text.162  Instead,
Dworkin seems to believe that the purpose of a thing that can be interpreted
(text, dream, ambition, etc.) is the best justification for the thing.  Dworkin
seems to believe that “interpretation” (given his understanding of that term)
simply is the identification of the best justification—hence the Unity of
Interpretation.
This brings us to his account of the “purpose” of statutory interpretation:
Statutory interpretation aims to make the governance of the pertinent com-
munity fairer, wiser, and more just.  That description fits what lawyers and
judges do when they interpret statutes; it justifies that practice, in a general
way, and it suggests, also in a very general way, what standards are appropri-
ate for deciding which interpretation of a particular statute is most
successful.163
I have argued in detail that the Unity of Interpretation Thesis is false,164
but the gist of that argument can be stated simply: We use the word “interpre-
tation” (in one of its senses) to refer to the activity of recovering communica-
tive content.  Dworkin’s constructive interpretation is actually a form of
construction (in the sense specified by the interpretation-construction dis-
tinction).  What we communicate by writing a text is one thing, how we
should put the text into action is another.
To sum up, to the extent that Dworkin has a sensible view, he endorses
the Fixation Thesis.  If Dworkin rejects the Fixation Thesis on the basis of his
claim about the unity of interpretation, his argument is demonstrably invalid.
C. Multiple Meanings
Consider one final candidate for a rival of the Fixation Thesis—the
claim that texts have “multiple meanings” rather than a single fixed meaning:
call this the Multiple Meanings Theory of constitutional interpretation.  No
159 RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (2011).
160 Lawrence B. Solum, The Unity of Interpretation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 551 (2010).
161 DWORKIN, supra note 159, at 125.
162 Solum, supra note 160, at 558–59.
163 DWORKIN, supra note 159, at 133.
164 Solum, supra note 160, at 559–66.
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theorist of whom I am aware has articulated this view as an explicit rival of
the Fixation Thesis, but it is “in the air” of contemporary constitutional the-
ory.165  The gist of the argument would go something like this: Texts do not
have a single meaning (in the linguistic sense); instead, they have multiple
meanings.  Some of these meanings are fixed, but others are not.  Because
there are multiple meanings, we must select between them, and this process
of selection must be guided by normative consideration.  Because some of
the possible meanings are not fixed in time, it follows that the Fixation Thesis
does not hold with respect to the complete set of the multiple meanings of
the constitutional text.
Some of the premises of the Multiple Meanings Theory are correct, but
from the true premises it does not follow that the Fixation Thesis is false.
Mark Greenberg makes the point that there is more than one type of linguis-
tic content in the context of a discussion166 of Smith v. United States167—the
Supreme Court case in which the question was whether offering to trade a
gun for cocaine constituted use of a firearm for the purpose of a penalty
enhancement provision.168
As the contemporary study of language and communication has made clear,
there are multiple components and types of linguistic content.  In Smith,
there are at least two types of linguistic content plausibly associated with the
statutory text that would yield opposite outcomes in the case.  First, there is
the semantic content of the statutory text—roughly, what is conventionally
encoded in the words.  Second, there is the communicative content—
roughly, what the legislature intended to communicate (or meant) by enact-
ing the relevant text.169
So far, so good.  Semantic content is distinct from communicative con-
tent.  Moreover, the Gricean speaker’s meaning of an utterance is not neces-
sarily identical to the meaning that the audience actually takes from the
utterance.
We can translate Greenberg’s point into constitutional terms.  For the
sake of simplicity, we can focus on three distinct “meanings”:
• Framers’ Meaning: The content that the authors of a constitutional
provision intended to convey to the relevant readers (e.g., the pub-
165 My reconstruction of the argument was influenced by a work-in-progress by Cass
Sunstein that was published subsequent to the completion of this Article. See Cass R. Sun-
stein, There Is Nothing That Interpretation Just Is, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 193 (2015).  My pres-
entation of the multiple-meanings view was also enriched by exchanges with Richard
Fallon, based on his work in progress, also published subsequent to the completion of this
Article. See Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for
Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235 (2015).  My version of the multiple-
meanings theory should not be taken as representing either Fallon’s or Sunstein’s current
views.
166 Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, 123 YALE L.J. 1288, 1291–92
(2014).
167 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
168 Id.
169 Greenberg, supra note 166.
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lic) through the readers’ recognition of the framers’ communicative
intentions.
• Ratifiers’ Meaning: The content that the ratifiers (or the subset of
ratifiers who were competent speakers of English and who read the
text) actually attributed to a constitutional provision.
• Literal Clause Meaning: The content that competent readers of a con-
stitutional provision would have attributed to a constitutional provi-
sion, given the conventional semantic meanings of the words and
phrases and their syntactic structure but without consideration of
context.
In theory, the three forms of meaning can come apart.  Literal clause
meaning is bare semantic content, and hence strips the text of contextual
enrichment.  Framers’ meaning can differ from ratifiers’ meaning; for exam-
ple, the Framers might have been mistaken about the conventional semantic
meaning of a word or phrase and hence the meaning that was understood by
the ratifiers could be different than the intended meaning.
So Greenberg is right; there are more than one type of content that we
could call “linguistic content of the text.”  But from this fact, it does not fol-
low that the Fixation Thesis is false.  That is because all of these forms of
content (framers’, clause, and ratifiers’) are fixed, albeit at slightly different
times.  Framers’ meaning is fixed at the time the constitutional provision is
drafted, whereas ratifiers’ meaning is fixed at the time the provision is rati-
fied.  Because literal clause meaning is fixed by conventional semantic mean-
ings that are unlikely to undergo rapid change, the period of fixation can be
thought of as extended in time, beginning with the initiation of the drafting
process and ending with official promulgation.
In order to get the Multiple Meanings Theory off the ground as a rival to
fixation, we need to add unfixed meanings to the set of multiple meanings.
But what meanings are unfixed?  We have examined two possibilities.  One
type of unfixed meaning is the fictional meaning that we discussed above in
connection with the Contemporary Readers’ Meaning theory.  Another type
of unfixed meaning would have been provided by Dworkin’s theory—if his the-
ory had really made the claim that the linguistic meaning of a text is altered
by our beliefs about what meanings would have been morally best.  Both of
these unfixed meanings are “meanings” in some sense, but they are not plausi-
ble candidates for the linguistic content of the authoritative tokens of the
constitutional text.
There could be other unfixed meanings.  For example, we might talk
about the “reasonable meaning” of the constitutional text—understood as
the meaning that is normatively reasonable given contemporary circum-
stances and values.  Again, this is a possible meaning, but it is not a plausible
meaning of the authoritative token of the constitutional text.  Rather, the
reasonable meaning of the text is produced by constitutional construction—
the normative enterprise of determining the legal content and effect of the
text.  The communicative content of the original Constitution, written in
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1787, cannot be plausibly viewed as identical to the content that would be
reasonable today.
We could go on—identifying possible meanings and then showing that
the unfixed meanings do not connect to the constitutional text in the right
way to count as interpretations (in the stipulated sense).  To be clear, this
claim is a promissory note.  To redeem it, we need to examine each and every
possible meaning that a multiple meanings theorist might produce.
* * *
Here is another way to get at the problem with the Multiple Meanings Theory.
Once we go beyond the plausible candidates (Framers’ meaning, literal clause meaning,
and Ratifiers’ meaning), what is the stopping point?  Why not say that the meaning of
the Equal Protection Clause is that Congress is constitutionally required to enact legis-
lation to create a Scandinavian-style social welfare state?  Why not say that the consti-
tutional text that seems to require that the president be thirty-five years of age actually
requires that he be a mature member of the Republican Party?  Presumably, the answer
to these questions is that those interpretations of the text would be unreasonable or
implausible.  But why?  What makes them unreasonable?  The answer, of course, is
that those interpretations cannot be tied to the conventional semantic meanings of the
words at the time and in the context in which the Constitution was adopted.  But this
answer assumes that there is a “meta-meaning” that sets limits on what meanings
count as reasonable.  But that meta-meaning must itself be subject to some version of
the Fixation Thesis, because it is the connection between a candidate “multiple mean-
ing” and the original meaning of the authoritative token of the constitutional text that
makes the candidate plausible or reasonable.
* * *
In the end, the Multiple Meanings Theory provides no independent
argument against the Fixation Thesis.  It is simply a fancy way of packaging
other theories.  If none of the unfixed meanings is plausible on its own, these
unfixed meanings do not acquire respectability by putting them in a box with
other plausible but fixed meanings.
V. FIXATION IN ACTION: THREE EXAMPLES
The issues raised by the Fixation Thesis may be clarified by examining its
application to particular examples.  In the discussion that follows, we will
examine the theoretical application of fixation to three constitutional
phrases, “domestic violence,” “cruel and unusual punishment,” and “privi-
leges or immunities.”  Importantly, I will not be making any claims about the
actual “original meaning” of these provisions.  Such claims can only be
redeemed by deep and comprehensive research—which I have not done.
Instead, I will make certain assumptions about linguistic facts and context.
These assumptions will draw from the research of others, but that research is
being used to inspire the hypothetical assumptions and not as evidence for
claims about the actual original meaning of the three phrases.
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A. “Domestic Violence,” Take Two
The phrase “domestic violence” has already been considered as an illus-
tration of the phenomenon of linguistic drift: the communicative content
associated with a string of text (the letters and spaces that make up the
phrase) or a string of phonemes (“d 'mestik 'vı¯( )l ns”) can change over
time.170  At this point, we will take a closer look at the example in light of the
objections and clarifications considered above171 and the scholarly commen-
tary on the example.
The point of the domestic violence example in this Article is to illustrate
the Fixation Thesis.  The phrase “domestic violence” had an original mean-
ing, roughly “violence that is internal to a state.”  That meaning is one of the
factors determining the communicative content of the domestic violence
clause of the Constitution.  The fact that “domestic violence” has undergone
linguistic drift and is now used almost exclusively to refer to violence within a
family does not change the meaning of the phrase in the constitutional text.
Mark Stein’s essay The Domestic Violence Clause in ‘New Originalist’ Theory,
does not directly engage the Fixation Thesis, but it does suggest that the
meaning of the phrase “domestic violence” could change over time.  Stein’s
central argument is based on a thought experiment, which should be quoted
in full:
Consider the following imaginary history of the Domestic Violence
Clause.  Before the Civil War, the Clause was applied only to insurrections
against state authority.  In the late nineteenth century, the Clause was
applied to gang warfare.  In the mid-twentieth century, it was applied to ordi-
nary street crime.  Then, in the late twentieth century, it was applied to
spousal assaults.  These expansions of the Domestic Violence Clause were
challenged in the courts, and all were upheld by the Supreme Court.  In
upholding the application of the Domestic Violence Clause to spousal
assaults, the Court noted evolving attitudes that see crime within a state as a
problem requiring federal assistance, and that further see crime within the
home as a problem of public concern.  The Court also observed that the
conventional semantic meaning of the term “domestic violence” includes
spousal assaults.  Although not in itself enough to justify expanding the con-
stitutional term “domestic violence” to include spousal assaults, the Court
said, this newer conventional meaning of the term “domestic violence” con-
notes that violence within the home is a problem of public concern.  That
represents a shift in attitude from the founding generation: While some men
of the founding generation undoubtedly thought wife beating was immoral,
they did not see it as a major problem of public concern.172
Does Stein’s thought experiment show that the Fixation Thesis is not
correct?  I hope that at this point the answer to that question is clear: Stein’s
thought experiment shows that the legal meaning associated with the phrase
domestic violence could, as a matter of fact, change over time.  But this fact is
170 See supra text accompanying notes 58–60.
171 See supra Part III.
172 Stein, supra note 57, at 131 (footnote omitted).
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consistent with the Fixation Thesis.  The claim made by the Fixation Thesis is
that the communicative content of the clause was fixed at the time the clause
was written: Stein’s thought experiment actually assumes that this is the case.
Indeed, Stein does not use the shift in linguistic practice to show that the
communicative content of the constitutional text changed.
If Stein’s argument does not disprove the Fixation Thesis, what does it
do?  Stein’s basic claim is that the change in linguistic practice evidences a
change in public attitudes toward domestic violence and that change in atti-
tude is relevant to what the law should be.  Using the vocabulary of the inter-
pretation-construction distinction, Stein’s argument is that a change in
linguistic practice could partially motivate a new construction of the words
“domestic violence”—and not that the meaning communicated by those
words in the constitutional text itself was changed.  Stein’s example would
illustrate a violation of the Constraint Principle, but it is fully consistent with
and tacitly assumes the truth of the Fixation Thesis.  The Constraint Principle
is a normative principle and not a factual claim.  Violations of a normative
principle do not show that the normative principle is false:  when Cain slayed
Abel, he did not disprove “Thou shalt not kill” (or “Murder is wrong”).
Another objection to the “domestic violence” example (but perhaps not
the Fixation Thesis) has been made by Michael Dorf and by Martin Redish
with Matthew Arnould.  These authors focus on the question whether the
example shows that originalist theory is necessary as a means to the discovery
of constitutional meaning.  Dorf puts the point this way:
But one need not be a semantic originalist to reach [the conclusion that
“domestic violence” refers to civil conflict and not violence within a family].
The new meaning[ ] of “domestic Violence” . . . ha[s] supplemented, rather
than supplanted, [its] original meaning[ ].  Any competent reader of mod-
ern English will understand from the context that the Guarantee Clause uses
“domestic Violence” to mean civil conflict . . . .173
A similar argument is made by Redish and Arnould:
[O]ne need not resort to a search for originalist meaning in order to dispel
the specious notion that the words “domestic violence” in Article IV could be
properly construed to include spousal abuse.  Rather, one needs merely to
employ a form of structural textualism, a concept which we can comfortably
include as an element of our version of “no brainer” exclusionary textualism.
The entire context of Article IV, Section 4, expresses a concern with the
need for federal protection of the states from invasion, and the need for the
federal government to protect the states against violence or insurrection.
The text of the provision reveals no other conceivable function or purpose
for the provision as a whole.  Thus, by examining exclusively the text of the
relevant provision, we are able to conclude that a construction of the words
“domestic violence” refer[s] to a need for the federal government to protect
the states from an activity that presents no existential threat to the state
173 Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2044 (2011)
(book review).
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would render them incoherent, in light of their textual context and struc-
ture as determined on the provision’s four corners.174
The point made by Dorf and Redish with Arnould is that the violence
within the family reading of “domestic violence” would be unlikely to gain
traction even if no one did research on the original meaning of the phrase in
light of linguist practice in the eighteenth century.  Thus, they disagree with
the thrust of Stein’s thought experiment—which is intended to show that
such a reading could be plausible, given the right sequence of events.  Of
course, Stein’s thought experiment describes a possible world, and in that
world, the new meaning of “domestic violence” might become so obvious
that we would need to do historical research in order to recover the original
meaning of the phrase.
It is not clear whether Dorf, Redish, and Arnould would view their
remarks as undermining the Fixation Thesis, but whatever their own view, it
should be clear that nothing they say about the domestic violence example is
inconsistent with the Fixation Thesis.  Their point is about the epistemology
of original meaning.  Frequently, we can grasp the original meaning of the
constitutional text without doing historical research.  In the case of the
Domestic Violence Clause, the context is sufficient to point us to original
meaning, and hence we are not led astray by the contemporary idiomatic
sense of “domestic violence.”  That point assumes that the phrase “domestic
violence” has fixed communicative content—so it cannot be an objection to
the Fixation Thesis.  But the whole point of the domestic violence example is
to show the plausibility of the Fixation Thesis.  So the discussions by Dorf and
by Redish, and Arnould are simply beside the point.
The domestic violence example serves a limited point.  It illustrates the
Fixation Thesis in a constitutional context.  The example appeals to what we
might call our “linguistic intuitions.”  If after due consideration you agree
that linguistic drift does not change the communicative content of “domestic
violence” in Article IV, then your considered judgment on this case lends
support to the Fixation Thesis.  But that is all the example does.
B. “Cruel and Unusual Punishment”
Consider another example that has already been discussed, the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment.”  The discus-
sion above was in connection with Dworkin’s distinction between concept
and conception.  At this point, we will examine the same constitutional provi-
sion for a different purpose—to show how a change in conventional seman-
tic meaning might obscure the communicative content of a constitutional
provision.  Thus, this example is a counter to the Dorf-Redish-Arnould claim
that research is unnecessary.
174 Martin H. Redish & Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation,
and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a “Controlled Activism” Alternative, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1485,
1529–30 (2012).
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The argument will turn on the meaning of the word “unusual”—a topic
that is sometimes omitted in discussions of the Eighth Amendment.  In the
discussion that follows, I will not be claiming to show what the original mean-
ing of the Eighth Amendment actually is.  A claim like that would require
extensive research, which I have not done for the preparation of this Article.
Rather, I will assume the correctness of the account offered in John Stin-
neford’s magnificent article, The Original Meaning of ‘Unusual’: The Eighth
Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation.175  The gist of Stinneford’s position is
that the word “unusual” had a different meaning in the late eighteenth cen-
tury than it does today.  A contemporary reader of the phrase “cruel and
unusual punishment” would be likely to gloss “unusual” as equivalent to
“rare,” “out of the ordinary,” or “exceptional.”  Thus, a cruel punishment
would also be unusual if it were rarely administered.  Stinneford summarizes
his interpretation as follows: “As used in the Eighth Amendment, the word
‘unusual’ was a term of art that referred to government practices that are
contrary to ‘long usage’ or ‘immemorial usage.’”176
If Stinneford is correct, the Fixation Thesis makes a substantial differ-
ence to the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.  The legal content that cor-
responds to the communicative content of the meaning would prohibit cruel
punishments that are no longer usual, but which have been continuously in
existence over a long period of time.  The original version of the meaning
would allow all punishments supported by long usage dating to the framing,
but would prohibit contemporary punishments that are cruel, in widespread
use today, but which do not have a history of long usage.
Stinneford’s interpretation of “unusual” can be clarified by introducing
the technical idea of an indexical.177  As used in the philosophy of language
and theoretical linguistics, the term “indexical” is used to identify words (or
phrases) that are indexed with respect to some variable, such as time or
place.  “Here” is an indexical.  When I say, “I am here” the word “here” refers
to a particular place.  It just so happens that as I was writing these words I was
in a restaurant in Mexico City, so “here” uttered by me on this particular
occasion refers to a spot in that restaurant.  “Now” is an indexical, indexed to
time: When I say “I am now drinking coffee” the word “now” refers to a par-
ticular time.  It was just after 11:00 a.m. Central Standard Time on February
18, 2015, when I wrote this paragraph, so the word “now” uttered by me on
this occasion refers to that time.  On my reconstruction of Stinneford’s
account, the word “unusual” is an indexical.  Whether or not a particular
punishment is unusual is indexed to the time at which the word unusual is
uttered or written.  In the case of the Eighth Amendment that suggests that
175 John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar
to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739 (2008) [hereinafter Stinneford, Original Mean-
ing of Unusual]; see also John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899 (2011).
176 Stinneford, Original Meaning of Unusual, supra note 175, at 1745.
177 See generally David Braun, Indexicals, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Jan. 16,
2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/indexicals/.
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“unusual” in context means “contrary to long usage indexed to the time this
Amendment was framed and ratified.”
The point of the example is simply to show that linguistic drift can make
a difference.  In the case of the Eighth Amendment, the immediate context
provided by the words of the amendment itself is not sufficient to give us
access to the original meaning.  Without examining the relevant history, we
might assume that the contemporary meaning is identical to the original
meaning and hence that the amendment prohibits only punishments that
are “rare” or “out of the ordinary.”
Just to be clear, the Fixation Thesis alone does not demonstrate that
contemporary courts should be constrained by the long-or-immemorial-usage
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.  Normative arguments would be
required to show that the best legal construction of the Eighth Amendment
should follow the correct interpretation of its communicative content.  In
other words, the Constraint Principle requires a normative justification.  The
example shows only that the fixed communicative content of the Eight
Amendment is plausibly viewed as different from what many contemporary
interpreters might assume given ignorance of the relevant facts.
C. “Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States”
Another example of the Fixation Thesis in operation may be provided
by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  After
languishing in relative obscurity for decades, the clause is now a focus of
renewed interest by originalist scholars.  The clause is especially difficult for
contemporary interpreters because the phrase “privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States” is opaque or obscure to modern readers.  With-
out access to evidence of original meaning, we simply don’t know what the
clause meant.  Robert Bork and J. Harvie Wilkinson have even endorsed the
view that the clause is like an “ink blot” and hence should be denied legal
effect.178
But it is at least possible that the original meaning of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause is not empty.  For example, in a recent book, Kurt Lash
argues that the words “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States” can be understood as a phrase of art, with communicative content
which (if given legal effect) would set a clear ceiling and floor on the set of
rights that a state may not violate.179  As of today, there is still dispute about
the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, but it is at least possible
that some theory (by Lash or someone else) will come to be accepted as
providing the best account of the original meaning.  The fact that the fixed
178 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 166 (1990) (endorsing the treatment of the privileges or immunities clause as like an
ink blot with no discernable meaning); J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL
THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 49–50
(2012) (endorsing Bork’s view of the privileges or immunities clause).
179 Kurt T. Lash, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities of American
Citizenship (forthcoming Cambridge University Press 2014).
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original meaning was forgotten would not entail that the original meaning
did not exist or that the meaning had changed, becoming an ink blot, as
access to linguistic facts about the phrase (“privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States”) became difficult.
Whether the fixed original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
should become its legal meaning is not a question to which the Fixation The-
sis provides an answer.  If we also affirm the Constraint Principle, then the
original meaning should be translated into constitutional doctrine.  In the
defense of the Fixation Thesis, the point of the privileges or immunities
example is illustrative.  The example shows that fixation can make a differ-
ence—if it is combined with constraint.
CONCLUSION
I hope to have convinced you that the Fixation Thesis is true, and, more
than that, that fixation should not even be controversial.  Once we under-
stand the Fixation Thesis clearly, the seeming objections begin to dissolve.
Consider each of the four objections that we have surveyed:
• The Concept-Conception Argument does not deny the Fixation The-
sis; instead, it identifies a particular kind of ambiguity (as between
general concepts and particular conceptions).  If the argument were
correct, it would show that the fixed communicative content of some
provisions is limited to general concepts, creating a considerable con-
struction zone.  But it is not clear that the argument is correct,
because it seems likely that the communicative content of the rele-
vant provisions is given by the conception of the concept affirmed by
the Framers.
• The Functional Kinds Argument is fully consistent with the Fixation
Thesis: it assumes that the meaning of functional kind words and
phrases is fixed by a real essence.
• The Open Texture (Family Resemblance) Argument does not con-
tradict the Fixation Thesis.  If this argument were true, it would show
that the family-resemblance words and phrases in the text are open-
textured at their periphery—a claim that is fully consistent with the
Fixation Thesis.
• The Contemporary Readers’ Meaning Argument is actually consis-
tent with fixation of original meaning—the real force of this argu-
ment is to deny the Constraint Principle.
It turns out that none of these arguments actually clashes with the Fixa-
tion Thesis.  That should not surprise us.  The Fixation Thesis is based on
our commonsense understandings of the way that communication works.
When we communicate using language, we rely on linguistic conventions and
context—and both are time-bound.  The conventional semantic meanings of
the words and phrases used in the Constitution were fixed by linguist facts at
the time each provision of the Constitution was framed and ratified.  The
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context of constitutional communication is time-bound—each provision is
framed and ratified at a particular point in time.
When we examine the seeming objections to the Fixation Thesis closely,
it turns out that almost all of these objections go to two issues that are con-
ceptually distinct from fixation.  The first of these issues concerns constraint.
Even if the communicative content of the constitutional text is fixed, there is
a further question whether the original meaning should constrain constitu-
tional practice.  When opponents of originalism deny that the meaning of
the Constitution is fixed, their real point may be about legal meaning and not
communicative content.  For some living constitutionalists, the important point
is that the abstract and general provisions of the Constitution create con-
struction zones that allow the application of the fixed meaning to contempo-
rary circumstances.  For other living constitutionalists, this may not be
sufficient: they may insist that judges and officials should have the power to
change constitutional doctrine even if that requires overriding the text.  But
for either form of living constitutionalism, their true opponent is not the
Fixation Thesis.
The second issue concerns determinacy.  Many of the seeming objec-
tions to the Fixation Thesis turn out to be claims that the fixed communica-
tive content of the constitutional text underdetermines constitutional
doctrine and the decision of constitutional cases.  Many originalists accept
some degree of underdetermination and freely admit the existence of a con-
struction zone.  Other originalists have argued the default rules or the origi-
nal methods of constitutional interpretation can reduce or eliminate the
construction zone.  But these debates between originalists and living constitu-
tionalists and between originalists themselves are not about the Fixation The-
sis—they are debates about the shape and size of the construction zone.
So this Article simply does not engage some of the most important issues
at dispute between originalists and some living constitutionalists.  Rather, the
strategy employed here is “one step at a time.”  We begin by securing the
points upon which agreement is most easily obtained, and then proceed step-
wise through progressively more difficult terrain.
Finally, none of the rivals of fixation provides an alternative to those
theories of meaning that entail fixation:
• The Contemporary Readers’ Meaning Theory is entirely consistent
with fixation, so long as the contemporary readers know they are
interpreting an older text.  The Fictional Meanings variant is simply
implausible as a theory of the meaning of the authoritative tokens of
each provision of the constitutional text.
• The method of Constructive Interpretation, as presented by Dworkin
himself, accepts the Fixation Thesis.  To the extent that it is modified
to make the claim that communicative content is transformed by nor-
mative beliefs about what the meanings should be, Dworkin’s theory
becomes implausible.
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• There are Multiple Meanings, but the ones that are plausible candi-
dates for the linguistic content of the constitutional text (token, not
type) are all fixed.  For the Multiple Meanings Theory to provide a
rival to the Fixation Thesis, there must be unfixed meanings, but none
of these provides a plausible alternative when considered separately.
Lumping them together doesn’t help.
The Fixation Thesis may seem controversial, but at the end of the day
the claim that communicative content is fixed of meaning is an obvious and
banal truth.  That it seems otherwise is a function of a failure to clarify the
Fixation Thesis itself or the true import of supposed objections.
* * *
If this Article has done its job, the Fixation Thesis should come to be regarded as
uncontroversially true.  Some nonoriginalists might characterize this as a trivial
truth—the real action is elsewhere—either the constitutional text does not constrain or
the text itself is indeterminate.  But for originalists, the obviousness of the Fixation
Thesis does not entail its triviality.  If originalists are right about the Constraint Prin-
ciple and if the constitutional text is sufficiently determinate in a substantial number of
important cases, then the truth of the Fixation Thesis should have important implica-
tions for constitutional practice.
The aim of this Article is to redirect the conversation about originalism.  Once we
put fixation to the side, we can focus on constraint and determinacy.  Even if original-
ists and living constitutionalists are unable to reach ultimate agreement, they may be
able to clarify the nature of their disagreement.  And that would be real progress in
constitutional theory.
